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BOSTON COLLEGE 
LAW REVIEW 
VOLUME XXVI MAY 1985 NUMBER 3 
"GUILTY BUT MENTALLY ILL": THE REAL 
VERDICT IS GUILTY+ 
[whenever strong emotions are aroused by a dissension of opinion, it is a 
sign that some basic problem, some instinct-like emotion, more fundamental 
than the issue formally under discussion; has smuggled itself in to cloud the 
issue itself and to interfere with the calm and objective examination of fact.' 
Few legal or  public policy issues in America today have aroused as intense conflict 
and emotions as the insanity defense. Although the insanity defense is invoked in far less 
than one percent of all felony cases, and is successful in only a fraction of the cases in 
which it is.invoked12 the view is widely held that the insanity defense is used to "coddle" 
t Copyright @ 1985 Linda C. Fentiman. 
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Zilboorg, Misconceptions of Legal Insanity, 9 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 540, 544 (1939). 
One of the most striking things about the public outcry over the "abuse" of the insanity 
defense is the dearth of evidence to support that charge. Nationwide statistics are impossible to 
obtain, due to very poor record-keeping among the individual states. See Steadman, Monahan, 
Hartstone, Davis, and Robbins, Menially Disordered Offenders: A National Suruey of Patients and Facilities, 
6 LAW AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR 31, 37 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Mentally Disordered Offeenders]; 
Limiting the Insanity Dejime: Hearings on S. 818, S. 1106, S. 1558, S. 1995, S. 2572, S. 2658, and S. 2669 
Before the SubComm. on Criminal Law, Comm. on the Judiciaty, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 367 (Tuly 14, 1982) 
(statement of Henry J. Steadman). But data from those states that do maintain records on the use of 
the insanity defense show that it is rarely invoked, and even more rarely successful. Thus, in New 
York it is estimated that only 0.17%, or 220, of the 127,068 felony arrests made in 1978 resulted in 
insanity pleas, and of these, only twenty-five percent, or fifty-five were successful. Id.  at 3. 
In Michigan, in 1977, the insanity plea was raised in 0.11% of all major felony arrests, and was 
successful in ahout eight percent of those cases. Criss and Racine, Impact ofchange in  Legal Standard 
for Those Adjudcated Not Guilty By Repton of Insanity 1975-79,8 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 261, 
264,271 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Criss and Racine]. The average number of insanity acquittals in 
Michigan during the years 1976 to 1982 was fifty-four. Smith and Hall, Evaluating Michigan's Guilty 
But Mentally Ill Verdict: An Empirical Study, 16 J.L. REFORM 77, 107 (1982) (Appendix A, Table A) 
[hereinafter cited as Smith and Hall]. 
Similarly, statistics from California show that in 1980 the 259 insanity acquittals represented only 
0.6% of all felony dispositions (the rest were convictions) in that year, and were only 0.1% of all 
60 1 
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criminals and to permit guilty and violent individuals to escape the criminal sanction.= 
This criticism reflects a basic misunderstanding of both the insanity defense and the 
whole of the Anglo-American criminal law as well. T h e  insanity defense is but one 
instance of the criminal law's historic insistence that before an individual may be punished 
. - 
for a wrongful act, h e  must have consciously elected to do  that wrong.4 This requirement 
of moral blameworthiness - that one must consciously choose to do  evil before punish- 
ment is appropriate - permeates the entire criminal law. I t  is most clearly seen in the 
requirement of mens rea, a guilty mind, but it is also found in the defenses of mistake of 
fact, duress, provocation, and self-defense, as well as that of insanity.= T h e  Supreme 
Court has never addressed the question of whether the insanity defense is constitutionally 
~ o m p e l l e d . ~  A strong case can be made, however, that it is so compelled, as part of the 
felony arrests made in that year. Turner and Ornstein, Distinguishing the WickedFrom the Mentally I l l ,  3 
CAL. LAW. 40, 42 (March, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Turner and Ornstein]. 
And in New Jersey: 
in fiscal year 1982 Uuly 1,1981 through June 30,1982), of the more than 32,500 adult 
cases handled by the New Jersey Office of the Public Defender, insanity pleas were 
entered in only fifty-two cases [less than one-sixth of one percent of all cases. Further, 
the insanity plea] was successful in only fifteen cases.  hat figure represents . . . 
one-twentieth of one percent of all cases handled in the course of a year . . . . 
Letter from Joseph H. Rodriguez, Public Advocate for the State of New Jersey to the Editor, 69 
A.B.A. J. 560 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Rodriguez Letter]. 
It is thus apparent that the use, let alone misuse, of the insanity defense does not explain the 
storm of contriversy constantly raging about it. 
For example, an October 6, 1981 Associated Press-NBC nationwide poll found that eighty- 
seven percent of the respondents believed that " 'too many murderers are using the insanity plea to 
keep from going to prison.' " Jeffrey and Pasewark, Altering Opinions about the Insanig Plea, 11 J .  
PSYCHIATRY AND L. 29, 40 n.4 (1983). Similar results were obtained in a spring 1982 study of 
university students and local residents in Laramie, Wyoming. In this study, ninety-four percent of 
the students and ninety-two percent of the residents agreed with the statement, "[tlhe insanity plea is 
used too much," and eighty-seven percent of the students and eighty-nine percent of the 
townspeople concurred in the belief that, "many people escape responsibility for crimes by pleading 
insanity." Id. at 33. 
Perhaps one of the most outspoken national critics of the insanity defense is Senator Strom 
Thurmond. Thurmond capitalized on the groundswell of public opinion against the insanity defense 
following the June, 1982 insanity acquittal of John Hinckley to push for a sharply curtailed insanity 
defense for federal defendants. In support of this legislative change, Thurmond argued: 
The issue of the insanity defense is one that cries out for legislative reform. Unfortu- 
nate as the verdict was in the attempted assassination of the President of the United 
States, it did serve to focus the attention of the Nation and this Congress on the serious 
short-comings of the insanity test presently applied by the Federal courts. People 
throughout the country, from every walk of life and of every political persuasion, have 
called for a change . . . so that the law will no longer allow the criminals of this world to 
escape responsibility for deliberate, violent vicious acts. 
We in the Senate would be shirking our duty to protect law-abiding citizens if we 
fail to take.the time of this Congress to reform the insanity defense . . . . and restore 
public confidence in our criminal justice system. 
. . . We must ensure that criminals who deliberately plan and carry out brutal acts 
of violence with full knowledge of the nature and wrongfulness of their conduct will be 
morally condemned by the community and held appropriately accountable for their 
acts. 
128 CONC. REC. S. 11,390 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 1982) (statement of Sen. Thurmond). 
' See infra text accompanying notes 243-55 for a discussion of this issue. 
See infra text accompanying notes 27, 244-51 for a discussion of this issue. 
See infra text accompanying notes 233-42 for a discussion of this issue. 
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requirement of moral blameworthiness which is at the heart of our  fundamental "concept 
of ordered liberty,"' inherited from the English common law, and thereby guaranteed by 
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.8 
Despite its firm foundation in English and American criminal j u r i sp r~dence ,~  the 
insanity defense has always been a source of great public debate. T h e  latest battle in the 
controversy was initiated by the June, 1982 verdict of "not guilty by reason of insanity" in 
favor of John Hinckley, Jr. after his trial for the attempted assassination of President 
Reagan. As a direct result of the verdict, over sixty bills were introduced in Congress 
aimed at either restricting or eliminating the insanity defense for federal defendants.I0 In 
October, 1984, these efforts culminated in the enactment of a drastically curtailed insanity 
defense as part of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984.11 T h e  new law makes 
insanity an affirmative defense for federal defendants, one which the defendant must 
prove by clear and convincing evidence." I n  addition, the test for insanity is an  extremely 
narrow one, focusing only on the defendant's cognitive impairment,I3 and excluding any 
volitional impairment due to mental disease o r  defect as a ground for a defense of 
Even before the verdict was reached in the Hinckley trial, public concern in recent 
years that the insanity defense was being used as a loophole by which the guilty were 
escaping punishment had persuaded two state legislatures, in Montana and Idaho, to 
eliminate the insanity defense altogether.I5 Moved by the same concern, twelve states - 
' Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). 
Morrisette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952); see infra text accompanying notes 
253-55. 
See infra text accompanying notes 22-48, 233-73. 
lo See American Bar Association, Standing Committee on Association Standards for Criminal 
Justice and Commission on the Mentally Disabled, Report to the House of Delegates, at 12 (February 
1983). 
Pub. L. No. 98-473,198 Stat. 1837 (1984) (signed by President Reagan on October 12,1984). 
l2 18 U.S.C. 402(a)(20)(b) (1982). 
l3 18 U.S.C. § 402(a)(20)(a) (1982) provides that: 
It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution under any Federal statute that, at the time 
of the commission of the acts constituting the offense, the defendant, as a result of a 
severe mental disease or defect, was unable to appreciate the nature and quality or the 
wrongfulness of hi acts. Mental disease or defect does not otherwise constitute a 
defense. 
l4 The new federal definition of insanity is, in effect, a modern and more narrow version of the 
nineteen century M'Naghten rule,see infra text accompanying notes 39-45. In contrast to the new law 
for federal defendants, the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code provides that a defendant 
may assert an insanity defense based on his lack of substantial capacity, due to mental disease or 
defect, either to "app;eciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct 
to the requirements of law." MODEL PENAL CODE 4.01(1) (1982). See also infra note 48. 
l5 In both Idaho and Montana, evidence of a defendant's mental disease or defect is not 
admissible in support of a defense of insanity, but may be offered only to show that the defendant 
lacked the requisite state of mind for the offense charged. IDAHO CODE 18-207 (1979); MONT. CODE 
ANN. 46-14101 (1983). In addition, in Montana, evidence of a defendant's mental illness must be 
considered by the court at sentencing, to determine whether at the time of the offense, "the 
defendant was able to appreciate the criminality of his acts or conform his conduct to the require- 
ments of law." MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-14-311 (1983). If the defendant lacked such ability, then the 
defendant is committed to "an appropriate institution for custody, care and treatment" not to exceed 
the statutory maximum sentence for the offense of which he has been convicted. MONT. CODE ANN. 
46-14-312(2) (1983). Idaho makes similar provision for the consideration of the convicted defen- 
dant's mental illness at sentencing. IDAHO CODE 19-2523 (Supp. 1984). 
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Alaska, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Michigan, New 
Mexico, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, and Utah - enacted statutes providing for an 
alternative verdict of "guilty but mentally ill" whenever a defendant asserts the insanity 
defense.16 In Oregon, the legislature reacted to concerns that insanity acquittees were 
being released from state mental hospitals prematurely by creating an entirely new 
governmental agency, the Psychiatric Security Review Board, to take over the functions 
formerly performed by the courts in supervising the treatment and release of insanity 
acq~ittees.'~In addition, in 1983, the Oregon legislature changed its denomination of the 
insanity acquittal from " 'not justly responsible. . . as a result of mental disease or defect' " 
to " 'guilty but insane,' "I8 again reflecting the increasingly widespread public hostility 
toward the "acquittal" of criminal defendants as a result of their successful assertion of an 
insanity defense. All told, in the last five years at least twenty-three state legislatures have 
considered changes in the insanity defense.Ig 
In view of the tremendous public outcry over the insanity defense reflected in this 
recent flood of legislative enactments, it is appropriate to reexamine the fundamental 
moral and constitutional principles forming the historical underpinnings of the insanity 
defense to determine if they are still applicable in the complexity of today's world. If the 
principles are applicable, it then becomes necessary to decide whether the alternatives to 
the insanity defense which have been proposed or enacted are in harmony with these 
fundamental principles. If not, then a determination of whether these alternatives to the 
insanity defense should be eliminated is also necessary. 
This article will first explore the reasons for the controversy over the insanity defense 
to provide insights, both historical and contemporary, into the purposes and functions of 
that defense. A brief examination will be made of judicial decisions in the last twenty 
years, which have largely, but not completely, eliminated the distinctions drawn histori- 
cally between the "civilly" and "criminally" mentally ill. The article will then examine the 
growing numbers of "Guilty But Mentally Ill" (GBMI) laws, with some emphasis upon the 
Michigan statute20 as the archetypal GBMI law. It will be argued that the GBMI laws are 
fatally flawed in two fundamental respects. First, they unconstitutionally undercut a 
criminal defendant's due process right to present an insanity defense, by encouraging 
juries to reach a compromise GBMI verdict in cases of mentally ill defendants charged 
with particularly heinous crimes. Second, because they do not guarantee, and usually do 
The constitutionality of Montana's statutory scheme has recently been upheld. State v. Korell,, 
Mont. -, 690 P.2d 992 (1984). 
l6 ALASKA STAT. 5 12.47.040 (1983); CONN. GEN. STAT. 5 53a-13 (repealed 1983); DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 11, 5 408 (1982); GA. CODE 5 17-7-131 (1984); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, 5 5.6-2 (1984); IND. 
CODE 5 35-36-2-3 (1982); KY. REV. STAT. 5 504.130 (1982); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 5 768.36JWest 
1982); N.M. STAT. ANN. 5 31-9-3 (1978 & 1984 Cum. Supp.); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. 5 314 (Purdon 
1983); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. 5 23A-7-2 (1983); UTAH CODE ANN. 5 77-13-1 (1983); see ako 
Institute on Mental Disability and the Law, The "Guilty But Mentally 111" Verdict: Current Slate .of the 
Knowledge (Williamsburg, Virginia: National Center for State Courts, April 1984) (Tentative Draft of 
Interim Report, "Guilty But Mentally Ill'' Project) [hereinafter cited as Interim Institute Report]. 
l7 OR. REV. STAT. $5 161.325 to .400 (1981 & Supp. 1983 ). 
Note, Battle of the Experts RemXted: I983 Oregon Legislalion on the Insanity Defense, 20 WIL- 
LAMETTE L. REV. 303,312-13 (1984) (quoting OR. REV. STAT. 5 161.319 (1981) and H.B. 2073,62d 
Or. Legislative Assembly (1983)). 
Ig Id. at 303 (citing The Insanity Defme: ABA and APA Proposals for Change, 7 MENTAL DISAD. L
REP. 136, 140 (1983)). 
'O MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 5 768.36 (West 1982). 
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not provide, psychiatric treatment to defendants found "guilty but mentally ill," these 
laws deny those defendants their constitutional right to such treatment." I n  conclusion, 
the article will explain why the insanity defense is essential to the integrity of the criminal 
law, and explore the alternative of conditional release as a way in which the many 
competing demands on the insanity defense can be reconciled while still passing constitu- 
tional muster. 
- 
A. His tmy of the Insanity D $ m e  
T o  understand the present controversy surrounding the insanity defense and to 
place the GBMI statutes in their proper perspective, it is necessary to take a brief look at  
the insanity defense and the special role it has played historically. Although the insanity 
defense began as a relatively uncomplicated legal device for exercising mercy in the case 
of a mentally disturbed offender, it soon was expected to bear the weight of a number of 
conflicting legal, moral, and social policy c~nsiderations.'~ Even before the development 
of the English jury trial system, the law recognized "that [ifl a man commits a misdeed 
involuntarily, o r  unintentionally, the case is different from that of one who offends of his 
own free will, voluntarily and unintentionally." T h e  result of this distinction in culpability 
based on mental state was leniency toward the accused, not his complete exemption from 
liabilit~.'~ 
Insanity had begun to be recognized as a defense to a criminal charge by the 
thirteenth century, although the chattels of the insane individual were still forfeited to the 
kingz4 By the fourteenth century, "a person charged with crime and found to be a 
madman was not acquitted; but a special verdict was given that he  was mad, and then the 
King pardoned him."25 Even at  this time, the criminal, civil, and political consequences of 
This right inheres in the recognition that the institutional commitment of the mentally ill 
without adequate psychiatric treatment is a violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth 
amendment. See, e.g., Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (the court held that a person 
involuntarily committed to a mental hospital after being acquitted of an offense by reasoning of 
insanity had a statutory right under District of Columbia law to meaningful, individually tailored 
treatment aimed at curing or improving hi mental condition); Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, 
784-85 (M.D. Ala. 1972) (any involuntarily committed menta! patient has a constitutional right to 
receive such treatment as will give him a realistic opportunity to be cured or to improve his mental 
condition). See also infra notes 82-84 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court has held that the 
eighth amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishment ensures prisoners the right to 
adequate medical treatment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). Lower federal courts have found 
that the right to adequate medical treatment includes adequate psychiatric treatment. See, e.g., 
Bowring v. Godwin, 551 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1977). 
22 The insanity defense has continued to become complicated because of the tremendous 
advances in psychiatric treatment made possible by the advent of psychotropic medication, and the 
concomitant changes in the law's view of what is appropriate treatment for the mentally ill resulting 
from these medical breakthroughs. 
23 N. WALKER, 1 CRIME AND INSANITY IN ENGLAND 16-19 (1968) (citing a 10th century law of 
Aethelred) [hereinafter cited as N. WALKER]. 
24 S. GLUECK, MENTAL DISORDER AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 125 (1925), cited in Note, Insanity - 
Guilty But Mentally Ill -Diminished Capacity: An Aggregate Approach to Madness, 12 J .  MAR. PRAC. & 
PROC. 351, 357 (1979) [hereinafter cited as S. GLUECK]. 
" Id. It has been suggested that the revenue-producing ability of the king's pardon was a 
not-inconsiderable aspect of its continuing use, and was perhaps a factor which advanced the time 
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being insane were closely connected. Exemplary of this intimate relationship is the Statute 
on the King's Prerogative @e Prarogrativa Regis) enacted between 1255 and 1290, which 
declared that: 
The king has the custody of the lands of natural fools . . . taking their profits 
without waste, finding them their necessaries . . . and after their death must 
return them to their rightful heirs. He must also see to it that [regarding] 
anyone who formerly had a memory and understanding [who] is no longer in 
his right mind . . . [that] their lands and tenements are safely kept without 
waste or destruction; and that they and their families live and are maintained 
from the profits; and that what is left for maintaining them is reasonably kept 
for their use when they have recovered their memories . . . . The king shall 
take nothing to his own use . . . .26 
Although this statute undoubtedly reflected the influence of the church, which insisted 
upon the importance of mens reaw as an essential element of a criminal offen~e,'~it was 
also an exercise of shrewd political judgment on the part of the king at a time when he 
sought to expand his power. Since it was necessary if a lord was insane that his land be 
under the protection of someone, the choice was either that the king would assert a power 
of guardianship or that the neighboring lords would take over the insane lord's property. 
The king naturally preferred himself as g~ardian. '~ 
By 1581 the notion that insanity precluded criminal responsibility was well estab- 
li~hed.~O In that year William Lambard published his handbook for justices of the peace, 
Eirenarchu, in which he stated: 
If a mad man or a natural1 foole, or a lunatike in the time of his lunacy, or a 
childe y apparently hath no knowledge of good nor euil do kil a ma, this is no 
felonious acte, nor anything forfeited by i t .  . . for they cannot be said to have 
any understanding ~ i l . ~ ~  
This test is significant both in its apparent recognition that one could lose and then regain 
one's sanity, and that the test for sanity was whether one knew the difference between 
good and evil. This latter distinction foreshadowed the M'Naghten test enunciated in 
1843.3L 
By the seventeenth century, the insanity defense had become significant both as a 
coroIlary to the fundamental principle of mens rea and as an important escape valve in 
the increasingly harsh system of capital punishment. As to the former, Blackstone stated 
when the insanity of the defendant would constitute a complete defense to a crime. See Halpern, The 
Fiction of Legal Insanity and the M k e  o f p ~ c h i a t t y ,  J .  LEG. MED. 18. 22 (1980) [hereinafter cited as 
Halpern]. 
26 N.  WALKER,^^^ note 23, at 25; see aLso Note, Lunacy and Idiocy -the Old Law and Its Incubus, 
18 U .  CHI. L. REV. 361,362 (1951) [hereinafter cited as Note, Lunacy andIdiocy -the Old Law and ILc 
I7lcUbwl. 
27 Mens rea, of course, is the mental state required for the commission of a crime. It is, in 
Blackstone's words, the "vicious will" without which "an unwarrantable act . . . is no crime at all." S 
KADISH, S. SCHULHOFER, & M. PAULSON, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS 
267 (4th ed. 1983) [hereinafter cited as S. KADISH, S. SCHULHOFER, & M. PAULSON]. 
* N. WALKER, supra note 23, ah 24. 
2s Note, L u w q  and Idiocy -the Old Law and Its Incubus, supra note 26, at 362. 
30 J. BIGGS, THE GUILTY MIND 83 (1955) [hereinafter cited as J. BIGGS]. 
31 See id. at 84 (citing EIRENARCHA Cap. 21.218). 
32 See infra note 41. 
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the law simply: "[Tlo constitute a crime . . . there must be, first, a vicious will; and 
secondly, an unlawful act consequent upon such vicious will . . . . [One of the deficiencies 
in will which excuses one from criminal responsibility] arises . . . from a defective or 
vitiated understanding, viz., in an idiot or a lunatic."33 As to the latter, the insanity defense 
was often the only way that the accused could avoid the death penalty." It has been 
suggested that the insanity defense was an especially important check against the draco- 
nian system of capital punishment because it was a defense based on "scientific" medical 
proof.% In an era in which death was the punishment for over 350 offenses in England, 
and over 200 crimes in colonial New York, insanity was a much neater way to circumvent 
the death penalty than were other, more obvious methods of jury n~llification.~~ 
Yet by the mid-nineteenth century, the pendulum had swung against the insanity 
defense. More and more it was viewed, at least by the politically powerful, as an inappro- 
priate device for granting exemption from criminal liability. Thus, in 1843, after Daniel 
M'Naghten was acquitted on grounds of insanity of the murder of Edward Drummond, 
secretary to Prime Minister Robert Peel, a huge outcry was raised on the part of Queen 
Victoria, the Prime Minister, and the House of Lords. They, along with a large segment of 
the British public, believed that persons who represented a threat to state security were 
escaping punishment by invoking the insanity defense.37 The language of the public 
debate sounds remarkably modern and familiar: 
mwo editorials] . . . from the Illustrated London News . . . . [argued] that 
M'Naghten was only simulating insanity and that soft-headed judges and 
doctors had let him escape the stern hand of justice. It was suggested that 
Bedlam, the "Eden of St. George's Fields," was a soft and pleasant place[,] 
. . . . a "retreat of idleness[,]" and that perhaps M'Naghten and other crimi- 
nals were "profitably insane."38 
As a result of this royal and public outcry, the fifteen justices of the common-law 
courts were summoned by the House of Lords to answer a series of questions as to the 
justices' view of the nature of the insanity defense and the circumstances justifying its 
invocat i~n.~~ It was the justices' response to the second and third questions of the series40 
which became known as the M'Naghten rule.41 Even at the time it was announced, the 
33 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 19.21 (1962 Beacon Paperback ed.) (emphasis in original) 
[hereinafter cited as W. BLACKSTONE]. 
34 Morris, The D a n g m m  Criminal, 41 So. CAL. L. REV. 514,518 (1968); Hill, Responsibilii>, and the 
Mentally Abncnmal Off&, 14 SOC'Y OF PUB. TCHRS. OF L. J. 81, 87 (1977). 
" Halpern, supra note 25, at 21. 
36 Id. at 20-21. 
37 J. BICGS, supra note 30, at 102-03, 107. 
Id. at 102-03. 
39 Id. at  102-07.. 
'O The second and third questions put to the common law judges were: 
"What are the proper questions to be submitted to the jury, where a person alleged to 
be afflicted with insane delusion respecting one or more particular subjects or persons, 
is charged with the commission of a crime (murder, for example), and insanity is set:up 
as a defence?" And . . . "In what terms ought the question to be,left to the jury as to the 
prisoner's state of mind at the time when the act was committed?" 
Id. at 103-04. 
41 As expressed by these nineteenth century jurists the test for insanity was as follows: 
[Elvery man ir lo be presumed to be sane, and to possess a sufficient degree of reason to be 
responsible for his crimes, until the contrav be proved to their satisfaction; and . . . to 
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M'Naghten rule was met with the criticism that it failed to define adequately o r  accurately 
those circumstances in which a defendant ought to be excused from criminal liabilit~.~' 
Nonetheless, it quickly became the law in England and America.43 
In the mid-twentieth century, dissatisfaction with the M'Naghten rule grew, stem- 
mingin part from a belief that the rule's focus on cognitive impairment as the sole ground 
for an insanity acquittal was psychiatrically unwarranted and inconsistent with the general 
purposes of the criminal law.44 Some also expressed dissatisfaction with the rule on the 
ground that it led to professional perjury. These critics alleged that expert psychiatric 
witnesses who believed that the defendant ought not to be held criminally responsible 
would force their testimony into the M'Naghten mold to give the jury grounds for 
rendering a n  acquittal on grounds of insanity.45 Dissatisfaction with the M'Naghten rule 
led to the adoption in 1954 of the Durharn4'j "product" test of insanity47 in the District of 
Columbia, and the American Law Institute - Model Penal Code test for criminal responsi- 
bility announced in 1962 as a model for legislative e n a ~ t m e n t . ~ ~  
establish a defense on the grounds of insanity, it must be clearly proved that, at the time 
of committing of the act, the party accused was laboringundersuch a defect ofreason, from 
disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or if he did 
know it, that he did not know that he was doing what was wrong. 
X Clark and Finnelly 208, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722, cited in J. BICGS, supra note 30, at 105 (emphasis 
added in J. BICGS). 
" The pioneering American psychiatrist Dr. Issac Ray immediately criticized the M'Naghten 
rule as being inconsistent with the reality of human psychology. J. Brccs, supra note 30, at 109-10, 
115-16. 
43 Only New Hampshire rejected the M'Naghten rule, through the influenceof Justice Charles 
Doe of the Supreme Judicial Court, who was persuaded by the writings of Dr. Ray that the 
M'Naghten rule was inappropriate. Id. at 11 1-16; W. LA FAVE & A. SCOTT, HANDBOOK N CRIMINAL 
LAW 286-87 (1972) [hereinafter cited as W. LA FAVE & A. SCOTT]. 
People v. Drew, 22 Cal. 3d 333,341-42,344,583 P.2d 1318, 1326, 149 Cal. Rptr. 275,278-81 
(1978); W. LA FAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 43, at 280-82. 
See, eg., People v. Drew, 22 Cal. 3d 333,334, 583 P.2d 1318, 1323, 149 Cal. Rptr. 275, 279 
(1978). But see W. LA FAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 43, at 282-83, and sources cited therein. 
46 Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954). 
47 The Durham court declared: 
[A]n accused isnot criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the product of mental 
disease or mental defect. 
We use "disease" in the sense of a condition which is considered capable of either 
improving or deteriorating. We use "defect" in the sense of a condition which is not 
considered capable of either improving or deteriorating and which may be either 
congenital, or the result of injury, or the residual effect of a physical or mental disease. 
Id. at 875. The Durham decision was overruled by United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 
1972). 
48 The American Law Institute (ALI) test for insanity provides that: 
1. A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a 
result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate 
the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct td the requirements of law. 
2. The terms "mental disease or defect" do not include an abnormality manifested only 
by repeated criminal and otherwise anti-social conduct. 
MODEL PENAL CODE 5 4.01 (Proposed Official Draft 1962), cited in A. STONE, MENTAL HEALTH AND 
LAW: A SYSTEM IN TRANSITION 230 (1975). The second paragraph has been adopted in some, but not 
all, of the jurisdictions which have adopted the ALI test of insanity. 
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B. The Disparity Between the "Civilly" and "Criminally" Mentally I11 
At about the same time that judges and legal scholars were struggling with an 
appropriate way to define those circumstances in which the insanity defense -was appro- 
priate, a legal backlash began to grow against the excesses of the "therapeutic state."49 In 
three landmark cases, Baxstrom v. Her~ld ,~~Specht  v. P a t t e r ~ o n , ~ ~  and Jackson v. Indiana,52 the 
United States Supreme Court went on record declaring that the different treatment 
accorded the "civilly': and "criminally" mentally ill violated the due process and equal 
protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment. 
In Baxstrom v .  Herold, Baxstrom, a New York prisoner, was certified as insane while 
serving a two-and-a-half to three-year term for assault. Accordingly, he was transferred to 
the Department of Corrections psychiatric hospital at Dannemora. When his prison 
sentence was about to expire, he was civilly committed after a court found that he was 
"mentally ill and in need of hospital and institutional careTS3 The court did not decide 
whether that care should be provided in a hospital operated by the Department of 
Corrections or the Department of Mental Hygiene, as it lacked statutory authorization to 
do so. Rather, that decision was made administratively and ex parte by the Department of 
Mental Hygiene. Thereafter, Baxstrom was reiurned to Dannemora, this time nominally 
under the control of the Department of Mental Hygiene. When, five years later, the 
Supreme Court reviewed his case, it found that Baxstrom had been denied the equal 
protection of the laws, both because he had been denied the right to a jury trial which was 
granted all potential civil committees under New York law, and because his commitment 
was based on an adminstrative, rather than a judicial, determination of his dangerous- 
ness, again contrary to New York's treatment of the "civilly" mentally ill. The Supreme 
Court ordered that a new judicial hearing be held, at which Baxstrom's present mental 
state, need for hospitalization, and potential dangerousness would be determined, with 
the same procedural protections and substantive criteria guaranteed prospective civil 
commitees. 
The following year, in Specht v. Patterson, the Supreme Court invalidated a Colorado 
statute that permitted defendants convicted of sexual crimes to be sentenced indetermi- 
nately without a hearing or an opportunity to confront the psychiatric evidence against 
them. Specht had been convicted of the crime of "indecent liberties," which carried a 
maximum sentence of ten years. On the basis of that crime, he was further convicted, 
pursuant to the Colorado Sex Offenders Act, of being a sex offender and committed for 
an indefinite term. The commitment decision was made by a judge, without a hearing and 
without the opportunity for Specht to confront the authors of the psychiatric reports 
considered by the judge. The Supreme Court held that this proceeding, with its possibility 
of much longer incarceration than that for his substantive criminal offense, denied Specht 
due process of law, and required the reversal of his conviction. 
In Jackson v .  Indiana, the Supreme Court struck down, as violative of both due process 
and equal protection, the indefinite commitment as incompetent to stand trial of a 
27-year-old deaf-mute who had the mental age of a pre-school child. The Court found 
See generally N. K I ~ R I E ,  THE RIGHT TO BE DIFFERENT: DEVIANCE AND ENFORCED THERAPY 
(1971), condemning the rise of the therapeutic state, in which indefinite civil commitment of the 
mentally ill and other social outcasts has been justified on the paternalistic grounds of treatment. 
383 U.S. 107 (1966). 
386 U.S. 605 (1967). 
52 406 U.S. 715 (1972). 
" Buxstrom, 383 U.S. at 108. 
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that it was so unlikely that the defendant, Jackson, might ever attain the competence 
necessary to stand that his continued commitment as incompetent was effectively a 
sentence of life imprisonment. According to the Court, Jackson's commitment violated 
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, in that, had he not been 
charged with a crime, the state would have been able to commit and continue to detain 
him only by meeting the more stringent standards applicable to persons alleged to be 
mentally ill or mentally defective and in need of treatment or custodial care. The Court 
also held that the failure of the state to accord Jackson " 'formal commitment proceedings 
addressed to [his] ability to function in society,' or to society's interest in his restraint. . . , 
or to the state's ability to aid him in attaining competency through custodial care or 
compulsory treatment"55 denied him thte due process of law. The Court ruled that "[alt 
the least, due process requires that the nature and duration of commitment bear some 
reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is c~mmit ted."~~ 
The trend, embodied in these three cases, toward abolishing the distinction between 
the "civilly" and "criminally" mentally ill has been cut short by two more recent Supreme 
Court decisions: Addington v. Texas5' and Jones v. United States.58 In Addington the Supreme 
Court declared that for a state to commit the mentally ill civilly, it need only establish the 
existence of the relevant commitment criteria by "clear and convincing evidence." Accord- 
- 
ing to the Court, a requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt would impose a 
burden too great for the states to meet in many cases, thus denying some individuals 
needed medical treatment.59 In Jones, the Court declared that a rational basis existed for 
holding an insanity acquittee in civil confinement long after he would have been released , 
had he been found guilty of the crime charged, relying on the argument of the District of 
Columbia that since Jones was being confined for purposes of "treatment, not punish- 
ment," an indefinite commitment was a p p r ~ p r i a t e . ~ ~  
C. The Function of the Insanity Defense 
Today, public concern over the insanity defense has called the continued existence of 
the defense into question. The perception that the ~ i n c k i e ~  verdict was a miscarriage of 
justice, along with an increased public concern with crime in general, has led to a new 
chorus of demands that the insanity defense be reformed or eliminated. Something about 
the insanity defense gnaws at the public, making people uneasy at the thought of 
releasing individuals deemed not legally responsible because they either did not know 
what they were doing was wrong or could not stop themselves from doing it. To a large 
extent, this concern arises because the defense is not simply a means of determining the 
question of responsibility for crime. Rather, the insanity defense has been called upon to 
accomplish a number of social purposes which are increasingly in conflict. These other 
purposes are, on the one hand, the public's desire to punish the mentally ill criminal and 
to keep him removed from the community for a number of years, out of fear that, if not 
Competence for the purposes of standing trial has been defined generally as the abiliiy of the 
defendant "to understand the nature of the charges against him and to participate in his defense." 
See, e.g., Jackson, 406 U.S. at 7 18. 
55 Id. at 738 (quoting I n  re Harmon, 425 F.2d 916, 918 (1st Cir. 1970)). 
56 Id. 
441 U.S. 418 (1979). 
58 463 U.S. 354 (1983). 
59 Addington, 441 U.S. at 432-33. 
60 JOW, 463 U.S. at 368-69. 
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incarcerated, he will offend again, and on the other, the public's concomitant but conflict- 
ing sense of moral obligation to treat, not punish, the sick. 
Essentially, the legal instrument of the insanity defense is being used to answer three 
questions: the moral question of criminal responsibility and blameworthiness, the psychi- 
atric question of the medically appropriate disposition of the mentally ill offender, and 
the social policy question of the proper means of protecting society from potentially 
dangerous individuak61 The difficulty of accommodating such divergent needs has been 
noted by the American Bar Association (ABA) Standing Committee on Association 
Standards for Criminal Justice and the ABA Coinmission on the Mentally Disabled: 
"Determinations regarding the defendant's criminal responsibility for the act are, in 
essence, backward-looking and are based on moral criteria. Dispositional determinations 
are forward-looking and depend primarily upon predictive judgments about the defen- 
dant's future behavior and the possibility of successful treatrnent."'j2 For one legal device 
to address all these criteria, and to provide mutually reconcilable answers to each, is a 
Herculean task.63 
Historically, much less was required of the insanity defense. As noted previously, at 
its inception in English law the insanity defense was primarily an instrument of religious 
judgment, providing an exemption from criminal responsibility to those who did not 
know the difference between good and evil or who lacked a vicious will. Although the 
defense was not without its political advantages to the monarchy, primarily it reflected an 
ecclesiastical influence: "[Tlhe insanity defense . . . was from our earliest experiences 
essentially a guide to the determination of the moral, rather than the medical, fibre of the 
individual.'"j4 
Yet at the same time, that moral judgment of "not justly responsible" was accom- 
panied by .the declaration of "too dangerous to be allowed on the public streets:" 
[The purpose of the insanity defense was] not to absolve of criminal responsi- 
bility "sick" persons who would otherwise be subject to criminal sanction. 
Rather, its real function [was] . . . to authorize the state to hold those "who 
must be found not to possess the guilty mind m m  rea," even though the 
These questions are not unique to the insanity defense. Anglo-American jurisprudence has 
also asked these questions concerning the defense of diminished capacity, the defense of voluntary 
intoxication due to alcohol or other drugs, and the appropriateness of premeditation and delibera- 
tion as the mental state distinguishing particularly heinous murders from other, "lesser," murders. 
See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE 5 210.3 comment, 5 210.6 comment (1982), quoted in S.  KADISH, S. 
SCHULHOFER, & M. PAULSON, supra note 27, at 441,425;  MODEL PENAL CODE 5 2.08 comment (Tent. 
Draft No. 8,1959),quoted in S. KADISH, S .  SCHULHOFER, & M. PAULSON,SU~~ note 27, at 806-08. For a 
broader discussion of the appropriate relationship between mental illness and criminal responsibility 
see Kadish, The Decline oflnnocence, 26 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 273 (1968) and B. WOO-ITON, CRIME AND THE 
CRIMINAL LAW (1963). 
62 The ABA Standing Committee on Association Standards for Criminal ~ustice and the ABA 
Commission on the Mentally Disabled, Report to the House of Delegates, at 8 (February, 1983) 
[hereinafter cited as ABA, Report to the House of Delegates]. 
The insanity defense is a dassic example of Professor Ernest Roberts' "tensile strength" 
theory of the law. According to Roberts, every legal principle can only hold a certain amount of 
emotional or political freight, and that amount is defined as its tensile strength. When a principle is 
pushed beyond its tensile strength by expansionist litigators or creative le'~slators, it will simply fall 
apart. Lectures by Ernest Roberts on Environmental Law, Harvard Law School (Spring, 1983). 
04 Gostin, JilSiijications for the Insanity Defense in Great Britain and the United States: The Conaicting 
Rationales of Morality and Compassion, 9 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 100, 101 (1981) [hereinaf- 
ter cited as Gostin]. 
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criminal law demands that no person be held criminally responsible if doubt is 
cast on any material element of the offense charged . . . . [Thus,] the insanity 
defense [was] . . . not designed, as [was] . . . the defense of self-defense, to 
define an exception to criminal liability, but rather to define for sanction an 
exception from among those who would [otherwise] be free of liability.05 
Historically, then, it has been possible for defenders of the insanity defense to say that it 
distinguished the "wicked from the "sick," without having to worry that the "sick" would 
ever get well enough to be released into the community. The underlying rationale for the 
lengthy commitment of individuals found not guilty by reason of insanity was a quasi- 
estoppel notion which has been aptly denominated "the clean-up doctrine" - "the 
assumption that a defendant is either responsible enough to deserve punishment or 
insane enough to deserve ~ommitment."~~ Twice in the last twenty-five years, the Su- 
preme Court has premised its decisions on this clean-up doctrine, declaring that because 
an insanity acquittee has been charged with a crime he is different, and less deserving of 
procedural and substantive protection, than a "civilly" mentally ill person. In Lynch v. 
O~erholser,~~ the Court upheld a District of Columbia statute which required that insanity 
acquittees be automatically committed upon acquittal, reasoning that, "cohgress might 
have thought . . . that having successfully claimed insanity to avoid punishment, the 
accused should then bear the burden of proving that he is no longer subject to the same 
mental abnormality which produced his criminal acts."68 The Court also hypothesized, as 
an alternative basis for the District of Columbia automatic commitment statute, that it was 
necessary to deter "false pleas" of insanity.69 
Likewise in Jones u. United the Supreme Court overlooked the precedents of 
Baxtrom v. Her~ld,~'  Specht v. Patter~on,~" and Jackson u. which had repeatedly 
invalidated the criminal-civil distinction in state treatment of the mentally to find that 
insanity acquittees and potential civil committeeswere different in terms of the procedures 
which could be used to secure their incarceration and the length of time that such 
incarceration might last.75 Specifically, the Court stressed the police power interest of the 
state, declaring that a "common sense" inference of continued insanity and present 
dangerousness could be drawn from the successful invocation of a not guilty by reason of 
insanity plea. Such an inference, according to the Court, obviated the need for the state to 
establish by clear and convincing evidence, as in the case of a civil committee, that the 
65 Goldstein and Katz, Abolish the 'flnsanity Defense'' -Why Not?, 72 YALE L.J. 853,864-65 (1963) 
(footnotes omitted). 
66 Note, Commitment Following An Insanity Acquittal, 94 HARV. L. REV. 605, 618 (1981). 
67 369 U.S. 705 (1962). 
a Id. at 715. Placing the burden on the insanity acquittee to show his present sanity was often 
justified on the ground'of a presumption of continuing insanity, particularly in states where the 
defendant had the burden at trial of proving that insanity at the time of the offense. See, e.g., In re 
Franklin, 7 Cal. 3d 126, 140-41, 496 P. 2d 465, 474, 101 Cal. Rptr. 553, 561-62 (1972)., 
69 L p c h  V .  OlverhoLser, 369 U.S. at 715. 
70. 463 U.S. 354 (1983). 
383 U.S. 107 (1966). 
72 386 U.S. 605 (1967). 
" 406 U.S. 715 (1972). 
" See supra text accompanying notes 50-56. 
75'50nes, 463 U.S. at 361-70. 
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individual in question was presently mentally ill and dangerous.76 At the same time, the 
Court relied heavily on the state's role as parens patriae, finding that because the purpose 
of commitment of insanity acquittees is treatment and not punishment, an insanity 
acquittee could constitutionally be "treated" indefinitely, for a term far. beyond that which 
he would have served had he been found guilty as charged.77 Thus, underJunes, a verdict 
of "not guilty by reason of insanity" is for many "acquitted defendants a sentence to a 
lifetime of incarceration. 
In practice, however, the likelihood for many other insanity acquittees is that they will 
spend a relatively short period in confinement, due to the convergence of two legaband 
medical trends. In medicine, the development and expanded use since the 1950's of a 
wide variety of psychotropic drugs,78 capable of radically changing a mentally ill person's 
symptoms and behavior, have completely revolutionized the treatment of the mentally ill, 
including insanity acquittees. Today, because many persons ultimately found not guilty by 
reason of insanity receive psychiatric treatment, including psychotropic medication, while 
awaiting trial,7g a large number of persons found not guilty by reason of insanity are 
declared, upon psychiatric evaluation after trial, to be presently sane.80 In Michigan, for 
example, between 1975 and 1982 forty-three percent of the 396 persons acquitted on 
grounds of insanity were released after the mandatory sixty-day psychiatric evaluation 
period because they failed to meet the criteria for involuntary civil ~ornmitment .~~ 
Simultaneously with, and partly as a consequence of, these medical advances, civil 
rights lawyers have mounted successful constitutional challenges to the treatment of the 
mentally ill, both those civilly committed and those found not guilty by reason of insanity. 
Critics of the mental health system have contended, and found state and lower federal 
courtjudges who agreed with them, that there is a constitutional right to such psychiatric 
treatment as "will give each [individual] . . . a realistic opportunity to be cured or to 
improve his or her mental condi t i~n ."~~  Although the Supreme Court has so far declined 
to find that a constitutional right to treatment exists,83 other courts have begun to build a 
76 Id. at 366. 
77 Id. at 368-69. 
78 "Psychotropic" is the general term used to describe medication which has an effect on the 
psyche, altering the feelings, thinking, and behavior of the person to whom they are administered. 
STEDMEN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1167 (1976);see Baldessarini, Chemothmafy, in THE HARVARD GUIDE 
TO MODERN PSYCHIATRY 387 (A. Nicholi ed. 1978). 
78 A mentally incompetent defendant may not stand trial. Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378 
(1966). Many insanity acquittees receive psychiatric treatment while awaiting trial to restore their 
competency. Criss and Racine, supra note 2, at 262. 
See, e.g., The Insanity Dgme, Hearings on S. 818, S. 1106, S. 1558, S. 2669, S. 2672, S. 2678, S. 
2745 and S. 2780 Before the Senate Comm. on the Jwlin'aly, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 464 (1982) (testimony of 
Dr. Robert Sadoff) [hereinafter cited as Insanity Hearings]. 
This data was obtained during several telephone conversations in March, 1983 with Dr. 
Harley Stock, psychologist at the Michigan Center for Forensic Psychiatry. The data grew out of a 
research project he was conducting with Dr. Lynn Blunt of the Center for Forensic Psychiatry 
[hereinafter cited as Blunt and Stock Study]. Some of the data from this research project has been 
reported by Smith and Hall, supra note 2. See also Criss and Racine, supra note 2, at 262. 
82 See, e.g., Ohlinger v. Watson, 652 F. 2d 775,.778 (9th Cir. 1980); Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 
451,455 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781,784-85 (M.D. Ala. 1972);Znre R.G.W., 
145 N.J. Super. 167, 178, 366 A.2d 1375, 1381-82 (1976). See also supra note 21. 
In Donaldson v. O'Connor, 422 U.S. 563 (1975), the Supreme Court specifically refused to 
decide the question of whether a person civilly committed as mentally ill had a constitutional right to 
treatment. Instead, the Court held only that the continued confinement, and thus deprivation of 
liberty, of a person who is not dangerous and who could survive in society with the help of others was 
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definition of the right to treatment which encompasses the right to be treated in the least 
restrictive way necessary to satisfy the state's interest in protecting either the individual's 
safety, the public's safety, o r  both.s4 At the same time, narrower, more definite commit- 
ment criteria and higher burdens of proof for both initial and continued commitment of 
the mentally ill have been found to be constitutionally required.85 Most significantly for 
persons found not guilty by reason of insanity, increasing numbers of courts and state 
legislatures have found that both due process and equal protection requirements man- 
date that insanity acquittees be evaluated soon after their acquittal to determine their 
present sanity, and that, if found presently sane, they must be released.80 In  addition, 
courts and legislatures have begun to require that criminal and mental health codes be 
amended to' eliminate the disparity between the procedures and standards used to 
determine the present sanity of insanity acquittees and persons involuntarily civilly 
~ommitted.~'  T h e  extent to which this burgeoning trend may have been dealt a severe 
setback by the Supreme Court's decision in United States u. Jones is as yet unclear.88 I t  is 
against this backdrop of the historical role of the insanity defense, and the more recent 
legislative and judicial reforms and medical breakthroughs which have occurred, that new 
approaches to the disposition and treatment of mentally ill offenders, specifically the 
GBMI statutes, must be evaluated. 
A. Introduction. 
When, in 1975, the Michigan legislature enacted the first "Guilty But Mentally 111" 
(GBMI) statute, it began a nationwide trend which has so far been followed by Alaska, 
Connecticut, ~e i aware ,  Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, 
a violation of the right to liberty guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. 422 U.S. at 576. For an 
intriguing analysis of the Court's decisionmaking process in the Donaklson case, see B. WOODWARD 
AND S. ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT 369-83 (1979). See also Youngberg 
v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982), in which the Supreme Court adopted a balancing approach 
between the legitimate interests of the State and the rights of the involuntarily commit- 
ted to reasonable conditions of safety and freedom from unreasonable restraints . . . . 
[Tlhe Constitution only requires that the courts make certain that professional judg- 
ment was in fact exercised. It is not appropriate for the courts to specify which of 
several professionally acceptable choices should have been made. 
. 
- 457 U.S. at 321 (quoting Romeo v. Youngberg, 644 F.2d 147, 178 (1980) (Seitz, C.J., concurring)). 
" Covington v. Hanis, 419 F.2d 617, 619 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657 
(D.C. Cir. 1966). 
sJ See, e.g., Addington, 441 U.S. at 432-33 (clear and convincing evidence required to commit a 
mentally ill individual civilly); Suzuki v. Alba, 483 F. Supp. 1106 (D. Haw. 1977), affd in part, reu'd in 
part, sub nom. Suzuki v. Yuen, 617 F.2d 173 (9th Cir. 1980) (In order for the state to commit an 
individual civilly, there must be a finding that because of his mental illness, there is an imminent and 
substantial danger of harm to himself or others, evidenced by a recent overt act, attempt or threat.); 
In re S.L., 94 N.J. 128, 462 A.2d 1252 (1983) (state may not civilly commit the mentally ill solely to 
provide them with custodial care). See generally, Groethe, Overt Dangerous Behavior as a Constitutional 
Requirement for Involunfu~ Civil Commitment of the Mentally 111, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 562 (1977). 
86 See, e.g., Bolton v. Harris, 395 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1968); People v. McQuillan, 392 Mich. 51 1, 
221 N.W.2d 569 (1974); State v. Fields, 77 N.J. 28, 390 A.2d 574 (1978); State v. Krol, 68 N.J. 236, 
344 A.2d 289 (1975). 
87 See,e.g., Bolton v. Harris, 395 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1968); People v. McQuillan, 392 Mich. 51 1, 
221 N.W.2d 569 (1974); State v. Fields, 77 N.J. 28,390 A.2d 574 (1978); State v. Krol, 68 N.J. 236, 
344 A.2d 289 (1975). 
" See supra text accompanying notes 70-77. 
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South Dakota, and Utah.8s Eleven more state legislatures have considered or are presently 
considering such legi~lation,~~ and the United States Attorney General's Task Force on 
Violent Crime has also recommended the enactment of the GBMI verdict as a supple- 
ment to the insanity defense for federal'crimes.~~ This section will examine the GBMI 
statutes of Michigan and other states to analyze the legal and policy implications of the 
GBMI verdict. The experience of Michigan and the other GBMI states will be discussed as 
exemplary of a nationwide trend in which courts and state legislatures have shifted away 
from a solicitous approach toward the rights of prisoners and the mentally ill generally to 
a focus on the protection of public safety. 
The GBMI verdict has a dual purpose. Its primary goal is to limit the number of 
persons who may be found not guilty by reason of insanity, thereby increasing the 
numbers found guilty -albeit mentally ill -and who are therefore subject to imprison- 
ment. Additionally, the GBMI statute holds out the promise of psychiatric therapy and 
treatment, in a prison setting, to defendants whose mental illness contributed to their 
commission of a crime. The attempt of the GBMI laws to satisfy both the police power 
goal of protecting the public by keeping dangerous individuals off the streets and the 
parens patriae goal of helping and treating the mentally ill, however, is seriously flawed. 
The statutes raise the gravest of constitutional questions concerning a criminal defen- 
dant's right to present an insanity defense, his rights to equal protection and due process 
of law when compared both with other criminal defendants and with other mentally ill 
individuals whom the state seeks to commit, and his right to adequate psychiatric treat- 
ment. 
It is the thesis of this article that the GBMI statutes are constitutionally invalid, for 
several reasons. First, they unconstitutionally attempt to undercut the ability of a criminal 
defendant to present a successful insanity defense. Due to the overlapping and substan- 
tially similar definitions of "insanity" and "mental illness" under the GBMI laws,S"t is 
possible, and indeed likely, for a court or jury to use the GBMI alternative to reach an 
improper compromise verdict. The availability of the GBMI verdict encourages the trier 
of fact to resolve its reasonable doubts about the defendant's insanity at the time of the 
offense charged in favor of a finding of "guilty but mentally ill," because of the factfin- 
der's desire both to keep dangerous people off the streets and to provide psychiatric 
treatment for the mentally ill. The possibility of such a compromise verdict denies the 
defendant his right to due process of law under the fourteenth amendment. 
Second, the psychiatric treatment promised by the GBMI statutes is not, in fact, 
provided in many instances, and a number of mentally ill offenders are therefore denied 
their constitutional right to treatment. Even in cases where psychiatric treatment is 
provided to individuals found "guilty but mentally ill," it is often not of the same quality 
provided to individuals found not guilty by reason of insanity or individuals who are 
confined under civil commitment laws, and thus the person found "guilty but mentally ill" 
who should have been found not guilty by reason of insanity is denied the equal protec- 
tion of the laws guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. Equal protection principles 
are also violated because persons found not guilty by reason of insanity will be incarcer- 
89 See generally Interim Institute Report, supra note 16. 
" Interim Institute Report, supra note 16, at 8, n.23. 
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S TASK FORCE ON VIOLENT CRIME, FINAL REPORT 
54 (1981). 
O2 See infsa text accompanying notes 120-32, and 193-217. 
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ated only as long as their insanity continues, while persons found "guilty but mentally ill" 
are committed to the state's department of correctionsg3 for a full prison term, regardless 
of whether they have recovered their sanity. 
B. Background of the GBMI Statutes 
To understand the impetus for the Michigan GBMI statute, the progenitor of all the 
other GBMI statutes, it is necessary to consider the 1974 Michigan Supreme Court 
decision in People v. M~Quillan,~~ and the public outcry following in its wake. In McQuillan 
the court struck down the Michigan law governing the commitment and release of 
persons acquitted on grounds of insanity, finding that it violated both the due process and 
equal protectionclauses of the fourteenth amendment. In reaching this result, the court 
relied heavily on four cases which had significantly eroded the differential treatment 
accorded the "civilly" and "criminally" mentally ill: Baxrtrom v. H e r ~ l d , ~ ~  Specht v. Patter- 
~ o n , ~ ~ a c k s o n  v. I diana,9' and Bolton v. Harris.98 
The decisions in Barstrom, Specht, and Jackson have already been discussed.BB In Bollon, 
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia relied upon the decisions in Baxrtrom 
and Specht to find that the same due process and equal protection considerations which 
had militated against a criminal/civil distinction among the mentally ill in those cases also 
required the elimination of that distinction in the case of insanity acquittees. To meet the 
constitutional objections which had been raised to the District of Columbia statute reqhir- 
ing the automatic civil commitment of persons found NGI, the court read into the District 
of Columbia law a provision for a post-acquittal hearing on an insanity acquittee's present 
sanity, to be governed by procedures "substantially similar to those in civil'commitment 
proceedings."loO The court rejected "prior criminal conduct" as a justification for sig- 
nificant differences in the commitment process and criteria,lol and declared that "[an 
insanity] plea is neither an express nor implied admission of present illness, and acquittal 
rests only on a reasonable doubt ofpast sanity, i.e. at the time of the offen'se."lO' Accord- 
ingly, the court permitted automatic commitment only for "the period required to 
determine present mental condition."103 In addition, the court incorporated into the law 
on release of insanity acquittees the requirements of civil commitment law: that a mental 
patient had the right to be examined by an outside psychiatrist and was entitled to a court 
hearing if any psychiatrist believed that he should be released. The court upheld, how- 
ever, the law authorizing judicial review of the mental hospital's decision to release an 
insanity acquittee, even though such review was not provided in the case of civil commit- 
tees. lo4 
A defendant found "guilty but mentally ill" may be paroled under the jurisdiction of the 
Department of Corrections for a portion of his term. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 5 768.36(3) (West 
1982). 
rrc 392 Mich. 511, 221 N.W.Zd 569 (1974). 
95 383 U.S. 107 (1966). 
gs 386 U.S. 605 (1967). 
406 U.S. 715 (1972). 
98 395 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1968). 
See supra text accompanying notes 50-56. 
loo Bolfon, 395 F.2d at 651. 
lo' Id. at 649. 
'OZ Id. (emphasis in original). 
Io3 Id. at 651. 
IM Although Bolton v. Harric has long been hailed as a major victory for insanity acquittees, at 
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In People v. McQuillan the Michigan Supreme Court followed the reasoning of 
Baxrtrom, Specht, Jackson, and Bolton, and declared that the Michigan procedures for the 
commitment and release of insanity acquittees violated the constitutional requirements of 
due process and equal protection of the laws. The court reasoned that an acquittal on the 
grounds of insanity established only that the state had failed to meet its burden of proving 
the defendant's sanity beyond a reasonable doubt, and that even this inference of lack of 
sanity at the time of the crime was of limited probative value after an insanity acquittal.105 
Hence the court held that an insanity acquittee could be committed for a period of no 
more than sixty days for an intensive psychiatric evaluation.lo6 Thereafter, the acquittee 
was entitled to a full-scale hearing on his present sanity, to be governed by the same 
procedures applicable to the involuntary civil commitment of the mentally ill.lo7 If the 
acquittee was presently sane, he was required to be released. If he was still suffering from 
mental illness, he was to be treated as a civil committee in regard to the standards and 
procedures applicable to his release.I0* In addition to announcing standards to be applied 
prospectively to the commitment and release of persons acquitted on grounds of insanity, 
the court also held that the 270 insanity acquittees presently confined must be given a 
hearing within seventy days or released.10s 
Within several months of the McQuillan decision, some sixty-four insanity acquittees 
had been discharged from confinement, having been found presently sane."O Within a 
short time thereafter, one of the sixty-four had murdered his wife, and another had 
committed two rapes.'ll 
The public outcry was enormous. Less than eleven months ,after McQuillan was 
decided, the Michigan legislature enacted the nation's first "Guilty But Mentally Ill" 
statute. Proponents of the GBMI verdict argued that it was necessary "to protect the 
public from violence inflicted by persons with mental ailments who slipped through the 
cracks in the criminal justice system," by permitting long-term incarceration of the 
mentally ill ~ffender ."~ Particular concern was voiced about those who, after an insanity 
least one commentator remains skeptical. Alexander Brooks has found that "[a] careful reading of 
the case reveals that judicial review became possible, not mandatory. Although theoretically either 
the hospital or the patient could initiate release proceedings, in fact the initiative was almost 
exdusively that of the hospital." A. BROOKS, LAW, PSYCHIATRY AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM 393 
(1974). Further, Brooks found that as a practical matter, only three percent of the 275 petitions for 
hab& corpus fled by patients at St. Elizabeth's Hospital in the District of Columbia during 1968 and 
1969 were granted. Id.  
loS McQuillan, 392 Mich. at 527-28, 221 N.W.2d at 578. 
Io6 Id. at 528, 221 N.W.2d at 578. In rendering its decision, the McQuillan court failed to 
mention that the Michigan legislature had reached virtually the same result by statute the month 
before the decision. 
lo7 Id. at 529-37, 221 N.W.2d at 577-81. 
lo8 Id.  at 533-44, 221 N.W.2d at 581-84. 
log Id. at 547,22 1 N.W.2d at 586; Petrella, Benedek, Bank, and Packer, Examining the Application 
of the Guilty But Mentally Ill Verdict in Michigan, 36 HOSP. AND COMMUNITY PS CHIATRY 254,255 (1985) 
[hereinafter cited as Michigan GBMI Verdict]. 
Comment, Guilty But Mentally Ill: A Reasonable Compomise fw Pennsylvania, 85 DICK. L. REV. 
289, 307 (1980-81). 
Comment, Guilty But Mentally Ill: An Historical and Constitutional Analysis, 53 J .  URB. L. 471, 
482-83 (1976). 
n2 People v. Seefeld, 95 Mich. App. 197, 199,290 N.W.2d 123, 124 (1980). Michigan legislators 
were candid in conceding that the goal of the GBMI statute was to keep more mentally ill offenders 
incarcerated for longer periods of time: 
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acquittal, were treated with drugs and then released, without any real "cure" of their 
underlying mental illness.113 There was widespread fear that such people would stop 
taking their medication after release, and would thus become "walking time bombs 
waiting to explode."114 Other advocates of the GBMI scheme stressed that it would 
provide needed psychiatric treatment for mentally ill offenders, which would serve both 
the goals of easing their suffering and of curing their anti-social and criminal tenden- 
cies.l15 Similar concerns were voiced by legislators and the public in other states.l1° 
C.  GBMI - The Statuto~y Scheme 
The  Michigan GBMI statute, enacted in response to McQuillan, thus was designed to 
meet the dual goals of public protection and psychiatric treatment for  mentally ill 
offenders. To assess accurately whether either of these legislative goals has been achieved 
by the Michigan GBMI verdict or the statutes modeled on it, it is necessary first to look at 
the various statutory provisions and then to examine how these statutes have worked in 
practice. 
Proponents of the guilty but mentally ill statute contendred] that it would protect 
society by allowing for incarceration of defendants who might otherwise be found not 
guilty by reason of insanity and subsequently released. The legislature anticipated that 
this statute would reduce the number of insanity acquittals, solve the problems of 
disposition, and simplify jury deliberations. One legislator commented publicly that the 
guilty but mentally ill statute was specifically designed to circumvent the McQuillan 
decision. The legislative intent was to give the jury an alternative to the verdict of not 
guilty by reason of insanity and thus guarantee that mentally ill offenders would not be 
released into the community before a definitive sentence had been served. 
Michigan GBMI Verdict, supra note 109, at 255. 
similar public concern was the impetus for the enactment of the GBMI statutes in other states. 
In Illinois, for example, Senator George Sangmeister explained the purpose of the proposed GBMI 
law to his collegues as follows: 
If you are found guilty but mentally ill . . . you're going to get the same sentence as if 
you were found guilty. You're not going to go back out on the street, that's the 
difference. You're going to get committed to the Department of Mental Health and 
then you're going to come back after you're cured to serve the rest of your sentence. 
That's the meat and guts of the bill, and that, apparently, is what the people of this state 
want. 
Chicago Tribune (Perspective), September 4, 1983, p. 1. 
Similarly, in Indiana, outraged public reaction to the murder of a mother and her three young 
children and concern that the defendant might successfully assert an insanity defense led to the 
formation of a group, Protect the Innocent, which worked for the enactment of Indiana's "Guilty But 
Mentally Ill" law. Note,Indianu's Guilty But Mentally Ill Statute: Blueprint to Beguile the Jury, 57 IND. L.J. 
639,639 n.4 (1982) (citing Indianapolis News, Sept. 11,1980, at 19, col. 1). In fact, the defendant was 
convicted and executed for the murders.Id. See Judy v. State, 275 Ind. 145, 148,416 N.E.2d 95,96 
(1981). 
lI3 Brown and Wittner, 1978 Annual Survey of Michigan Law: Criminal Law, 25 WAYNE L. REV. 
335, 356 (1979). 
11' Id. (quoting Detroit News (Magazine), Oct. 1, 1978, at 47). 
l"s the Michigan Supreme Court expressed it: 
[Tlhe Legislature's object in creating this new verdict was to assure supervised mental 
health treatment and care for those persons convicted under the laws of our state who 
are found to be suffering from mental illness, in the humane hope of restoring their 
mental health and possibly thereby deterring any future criminal conduct on their part. 
People v. McLeod, 407 Mich. 632, 663-64, 288 N.W.2d 909, 919 (1980). 
l1"ee supra note 112. 
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T h e  statutes may be most easily understood if they are viewed as having two concep- 
tually distinct parts: first, provisions setting forth the procedures for the rendering of a 
GBMI verdict, and second, provisions elaborating the consequences of such a verdict. 
T h e  statutes generally declare that the GBMI verdict is an alternative to the finding of 
"Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity," and delineate those findings which must be made by 
the trier of fact to render such a GBMI verdict. Many of the statutes set forth specific 
information the jury is to consider in reaching its conclusion, including, in some states, the 
- ~ 
differing consequences of an insanity acquittal and a GBMI verdict. Most often, an  
insanity acquittee is committed to a mental hospital, while a defendant found "guilty but 
mentally ill" is sent to state prison. 
1. What the Verdict Requires 
Under most of the states' schemes, "guilty but mentally ill" becomes available as a 
verdict only when the defendant places his sanity in issue by raising a defense of not guilty 
by reason of insanity.l17~he ~ i c h i ~ a n  statute is typical. In  that state, a defendant who has 
pp~ - 
"' In Michigan, the verdict of "guilty but mentally ill" is available as an option only if the 
defendant files notice with the trial court of his intent to raise an insanity defense. The GBMI verdict 
does not come into play if the defendant enters a plea of not guilty or if he pleads guilty. MICH. 
COMP. LAWS ANN. $8 768.36(1), (2) (West 1982) provide that: 
(1) If the defidunt asserts a &fme of insanity in compliance with section 20a [which 
requires 30 days notice to the court and prosecutor if the defendant intends to assert 
the insanity defense in a felony case], the defendant may be found "guilty but mentally 
ill" if, after trial, the trier of fact finds all of the following beyond a reasonable doubt: 
(a) That the defendant is guilty of an offense, 
(b) That the defendant was mentally ill at the time of the commission of that offense, 
(c) That the defendant was not le&lly insane at the time of the commission of that 
offense. 
(emphasis added) 
(2) If the defendant asserts a defense of insanity in compliance with section 20a and the 
defendant waives his right to trial, by jury or by judge, the trialjudge, with the approval 
of the prosecuting attorney, may accept a plea of guilty but mentally ill in lieu of a plea 
of guilty or a plea of nolo contendre. The judge may not accept a plea of guilty but 
mentally ill until, with the defendant's consent, he has examined the report or reports 
prepared pursuant to section 20a, has held a hearing on the issue of the defendant's 
mental illness at which either party may present evidence, and is satisfied that the 
defendant was mentally ill at the time of the offense to which the plea is entered. The 
reports shall be made a part of the record of the case. 
Alaska, Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky;Pennsylvania, South Dakota and Utah have similar provi- 
sions. Georgia law provides that: 
In all cases in which the defme ofinsanity Q intkrposed, the jury, or the court if tried by it, 
shall find whether the defendant is: 
(1) Guilty; 
(2) Not guilty; 
(3) Not guilty by reason of insanity at the time of the crime; or 
(4) Guilty but mentally ill at the time of the crime, but the finding of the guilty but 
mentally ill shall be made only in felony cases. 
GA. CODE ANN. $ 17-7-131(b) (Supp. 1985) (emphasis added). 
Under Indiana law: 
In all cases in which tJw defme of insanity Q interposed, the jury (or the court if tried by it) 
shall find whether the defendant is: 
(1) Guilty; 
(2) Not guilty; 
(3) Not responsible by reason of insanity at the time of the crime; or 
(4) Guilty but mentally ill at the time of the crime. 
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raised a n  insanity defense may be  found  "guilty but  mentally ill" if, after  a jury  or court 
trial, t he  tr ier  of  fact finds beyond a reasonable doubt:"8 
IND. CODE 5 35-36-2-3 (1985) (emphasis added). 
Under Kentucky law: 
In cases in which the defendant provides evidence at trial of his mental illness or 
insanity at the time of the offense, the jury or court may find the defendant: 
(1) Guilty; 
(2) Not guilty; 
(3) Not guilty by reason. of insanity at the time of the offense; or 
(4) Guilty but mentally ill at the time of the offense. 
KY. REV. STAT. 0 504.120 (1985). 
Under South Dakota law: 
If the defense of insanity or mental illness has been presented during a trial, the 
court shall provide the jury with a special verdict form of "guilty but mentally ill" for 
each offense. The court shall instruct the jury that a special verdict of "guilty but 
mentally ill" may be returned instead of a general verdict. The court shall also instruct 
that jury that the special verdict requires a finding beyond a reasonable doubt by the 
jury that the defendant committed the offense and that the defendant was not insane at 
the time he committed the offense, but that he was mentally ill at the time. 
S.D. COD~FIED LAWS ANN. 5 23A-25-13 (Supp. 1984). 
So too in Alaska, it is only where a defendant files notice that he intends to raise a defense of 
insanity o r  a defense that he lacked the m m  rea required for the commission of the crime (which, if 
successful, results in a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity, ALASKA STAT. 0 12.47.020a (1984)), 
that the trier of fact will be given the opportunity to find the defendant "guilty but mentally ill." 
ALASKA STAT. 5 12.47.040(a) (1984) provides that: 
In a prosecution for a crime when the affirmative &fme of insanity i s  raked under AS 
12.47.010, o r  when evidence of a mental disease o r  defect of the defendant is othenvise 
admissible at trial under AS 12.47.020, the trier of fact shall find, and the verdict shall 
state, whether the defendant is 
(1) Guilty; 
(2) Not guilty; 
(3) Not guilty by reason of insanity; or 
(4) Guilty but mentally ill. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
Similarly, in Pennsylvania: 
A person who timely offers a defme of insanity in accordance with the Rules of Criminal 
Procedure may be found "guilty but mentally ill" at trial if the trier of facts finds, 
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the person is guilty of an offense, was mentally ill at the 
time of the commission of the offense and was not legally insane at the time of the 
commission of the offense. 
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. 5 314(a) (Purdon 1983) (emphasis added). 
Utah law provides that: 
If a defendant at trial asserts a defense of "not guilty by reason of insanity," the court 
- shall instruct the jury that they may find the defendant guilty, not guilty, not guilty by 
reason of insanity, guilty and mentally ill, guilty of a lesser offense, or guilty of a lesser 
offense due to mental illness but not such illness as would warrant full exoneration. 
Upon a verdict of guilty and mentally ill to the offense charged, or any lesser offense, 
the court shall hold a hearing as provided in this section, and if the court finds that the 
defendant is currently mentally ill, it shall sentence the defendant as a mentally ill 
offender. 
UTAH CODE ANN. 5 77-35-21,5 (Supp. 1983). 
The Delaware and Illinois statutes are silent as to the circumstances when a judgment of "guilty 
but mentally ill'' may be rendered. 
" B  Georgia, Pennsylvania, and South Dakota also require that the proof that a defendant is 
"guilty but mentally ill" be beyond a reasonable doubt. GA. CODE ANN. 5 17-7-131(c)(2) (Supp. 1985); 
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(a) that the defendant is guilty of an offense, 
(b) that the defendant was mentally ill at the time of the commission of that 
offense, and 
(c) that the defendant was not legally insane at  the time of the commission of 
that ~ f f e n s e . " ~  
The key to applying this test lies, of course, in the distinction between ''mentally ill" and 
"insane." Some, but not all, of the GBMI states provide statutory definitions of "mental 
illness" and "insanity" for the guidance of the trier of fact in determining whether the 
defendant is not guilty by reason of insanity, "guilty but mentally ill," guilty, or not 
guilty."O Most of these definitions of "mental illness" and "insanity" are so similar, 
however, that even a highly sophisticated and thoughtful factfinder would have great 
difficulty distinguishing between the two. 
Michigan, for example, defines "mental illness" as a "substantial disorder of thought 
or  mood which significantly impairs judgment, behavior, capacity to recognize reality, o r  
ability to cope with the ordinary demands of life."'21 T h e  Michigan definition of insanity 
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. 314(a) (Purdon 1983); S. D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. 23A-25-13 (Supp. 
1984). 
In Alaska and Kentucky, the trier of fact need not be so certain of its GBMI verdict. The Alaska 
statute provides that: 
To return a verdict of Guilty But Mentally I11 under (a)(4) of this section, the jury must 
find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime and find by a 
preponderance of the evidence that when the defendant committed the crime the 
defendant was guilty but mentally ill as defined in AS 12.47.030. 
ALASKA STAT. 8 12.47.040(b) (1984). 
Under Kentucky law, . 
[t]he defendant may be found guilty but mentally ill if: 
(a) The prosecution proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty 
of an offense; and 
(b) The defendant proves by a preponderance of the evidence that he was men- 
tally ill at the time of the offense. 
KY. REV. STAT. 504.130(1) (1985). 
The Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, and Utah statutes are silent on the standard of proof to be used 
in determining whether a defendant is "guilty but mentally ill." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,s 408 (Supp. 
1984); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38,6-2 (Smith-Hurd 1972 & Supp. 1984); IND. CODE 35-36-2-3 (1985); 
UTAH CODE ANN. $ 77-13-1 (Supp. 1983). 
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. !j 768.36(1) (West 1982); see supra note 117. 
lZ0 Delaware provides only a definition of insanity. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, 401 (Supp. 1984) 
provides that: 
(a) In any prosecution for an offense, it is an affirmative defense that, at the time of the 
conduct charged, as a result of mental illness or mental defect, the .accused lacked 
substantial capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct. If the defendant 
prevails in establishing the affirmative defense provided in this section, the trier of facts 
shall return a verdict of "not guilty by reason of insanity." 
12' MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.1400a (West 1980). . 
The Georgia definition of "mental illness" is very similar. Under GA. CODE ANN. 17-7-131(a)(2) 
(Supp. 1985): 
"Mentally ill" means having a disorder of thought or mood which significantly impairs 
judgment, behavior, capacity to recognize reality, or ability to cope with the ordinary 
demands of life or having a state of significantly subaverage general intellectual func- 
tioning existing concurrently with defects of adaptive behavior which originates in the 
developmental period. However, the term "mental illness" shall not include a mental 
, state manifested only by repeated unlawful or antisocial conduct. 
Georgia defines "insanity" in accordance with the M'Naghten rule. GA. CODE ANN. 5 16-3-2 
(1984) declares: 
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both incorporates this definition of mental illness and is, simultaneously, very similar to it. 
T h e  Michigan statute follows the Model Penal Code definition of insanity, declaring that: 
A person is legally insane if, as a result of mental illness . . . o r  mental 
retardation . . . that person lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the 
wrongfulness of his conduct o r  to conform his conduct to the requirements of 
law."" 
Similarly, under Indiana law, "mentally ill" is defined as "having a psychiatric disorder 
which substantially disturbs a person's thinking, feeling, or  behavior and impairs the 
person's ability to function . . . [or] having any mental retardati~n.""~ Indiana, like 
Michigan, defines insanity by the Model Penal Code test."4 Kentucky also follows the 
Model Penal Code test for insanity,'" but defines "mental illness" as "substantially im- 
paired capacity to use self-control, judgment or discretion in the conduct of one's affairs 
and social relations, associated with maladaptive behavior or  recognized emotional symp- 
toms where impaired capacity, maladaptive behavior or  emotional symptoms can be 
related to physiological, psychological o r  social  factor^.""^ 
Perhaps the slimmest of all distinctions between a defendant who should be acquitted 
on grounds of insanity and a defendant who should be found "guilty but mentally ill" is 
drawn by the Alaska and Pennsylvania statutes. T h e  Alaska Code provides that: 
[I]t is an affirmative defense of insanity that when the defendant engaged in 
the criminal conduct, the defendant was unable, as a result of a mental disease 
o r  defect, to appreciate the nature and quality of that conduct. . . . Evidence 
of a mental disease or  defect that is manifested only by repeated criminal o r  
other antisocial conduct is not sufficient to establish the affirmative defense 
under (a) of this section.J27 
This definition of "insanity," which is a modern formulation of the M'Naghten rule 
combined with part of the ALI test for insanity, is remarkably similar to the Alaska 
A person shall not be found guilty of a crime if, at the time of the act, omission, or 
negligence constituting the crime, the person did not have mental capacity to distin- 
guish between right and wrong in relation to such act, omission, or negligence. 
Iz2 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 5 768.21a (West 1982). Michigan precludes the assertion of the 
insanity defense by one who is voluntarily intoxicated due to the ingestion of drugs or alcohol. Id. 
I* IND. CODE 5 35-36-1-1 (1985). 
Iz4 IND. CODE 5 35-41-3-6 (1985) provides that: 
(a) A person is not responsible for having engaged in prohibited conduct if, as a result 
of mental disease or defect, he was unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of the 
conduct at the time of the offense. 
(b) As used in this section, "mental disease or defect" means a severely abnormal 
mental condition that grossly and demonstrably impairs a person's perception, but 
the term does not include an abnormality manifested only by repeated unlawful or 
antisocial conduct. 
Iz5 Kentucky law provides for a defense of insanity as follows: 
(1) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct, as a 
result of mental disease or defect, he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate 
the criminality of his conductor to conform his conduct to the requirements of law. 
(2) As used in this chapter, the term "mental disease or defect" does not include an 
abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct. 
KY. REV. STAT. 5 504.020 (1985); see also KY. REV. STAT. 5 504.060(4) (1985). 
KY. REV. STAT. 5 504.060(5) (1985); see also KY. REV. STAT. 5 202A.014 (1985). 
Iz7 ALASKA STAT. 5 12.47.010 (1984). 
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statute's definition of "guilty but mentally ill," which is taken directly from the ALI 
definition of insanity: 
(a) A defendant is guilty but mentally ill if, when the defendant engaged in 
the criminal conduct, the defendant lacked, as a result of a mental disease 
or defect, the substantial capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of 
that conduct or to conform that conduct to the requirements of law. . . . 
(b) Evidence of a mental disease or defect that is manifested only by repeated 
criminal or antisocial conduct is not sufficient to establish that the defen- 
dant was guilty but mentally ill under (a) of this section.128 
Pennsylvania also defines insanity in accordance with the M'Naghten rule and "men- 
tal illness" using the Model Penal Code definition of insanity. Pennylvania law thus 
provides the following definitions: 
(1) "Mentally ill." One who as a result of mental disease or defect, lacks 
substantial capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct 
or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. 
(2) "Legal insanity." At the time of the commission of the act, the defendant 
was laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as 
not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing or, if he did 
know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong.12g 
These two statutes come close to making a distinction without a difference in terms of 
the accused's mental state at the time of the offense. T o  define the requirements for a 
verdict of "guilty but mentally ill" in precisely the sa'me terms which most other jurisdic- 
tions use to define insanity is an open invitation for:the jury to render a verdict of "guilty 
but mentally ill" whenever it believes the defendant-$'idbuffer from mental illness at the 
time of the offense but is concerned about releas&i-hi& into the community. 
In Illinois, the statutory definition of mental ill&% i;<ouched in terms that appear to 
exclude insanity. The Illinois statute defines "mental' i<l*ss" as: 
a substantial disorder of thought, mood, or behavior which afflicted a person 
at the time of the commission of the offense and whfih impaired that person's 
judgment, but not to the extent that he is unable to appreciate the wrongful- 
ness of his behavior or is unable to conform his conduct to the requirements 
Insanity, by contrast, is defined in accordance with the Model Penal Code standard. Yet 
even this more substantive distinction provides only limited guidance to the jury as to how 
to make the ultimate choice between "mere" mental illness and insanity.131 As will be 
discussed in detail subsequently, some critics of the GBMI verdict have argued that 
lZ8 ALASKA STAT. 5 12.47.030 (1984). 
lZ9 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. 5 314(c) (Purdon 1983). 
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, 5 6-2(d) (Smith-Hurd 1972 & Supp. 1984). . 
13' ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, 5 6-2 (Smith-Hurd 1972 & Supp. 1984) provides: 
(a) A person is not criminally responsible for conduct if at the time of such conduct, as 
a result of mental disease or mental defect, he lacks substantial capacity either to 
appreciate the criminality of hi conduct or to conform his conduct to the require- 
ments of law. 
(b) The terms "mental disease or mental defect" do not include an abnormality man- 
ifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct. 
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because many of the GBMI statutes' definitions of "insanity" and "mental illness" are 
virtually identical, at least from the viewpoint of the average layperson, it becomes 
extremely likely that a jury will reach a compromise verdict of "guilty but mentally ill" in 
cases in which the defendant actually meets the statutory test of insanity but has commit- 
ted such a reprehensible act that the jury is reluctant to see him return soon to the 
community. 13" 
In  addition to a court orjury finding of "guilty but mentally ill," a defendant may also 
be found "guilty but mentally ill" under the statutes if he  enters a plea to that effect.133 As 
a general matter, the court may accept the plea after reading the pre-trial psychiatric 
reports prepared in response to the defendant's NGI plea, and after holding a hearing on 
the defendant's mental illness. T o  accept the plea, however, the court must be "satisfied 
that the defendant was mentally ill at the time of the offense."134 T h e  data on the actual 
use of "guilty but mentally ill" as a plea are very limited. In Michigan, however, approxi- 
mately sixty percent of the GBMI verdicts result from plea bargains, while the remaining 
forty percent are divided equally between court and jury tria1s.l" 
2. Disposition After a GBMI Verdict 
Once a defendant has been found "guilty but mentally ill," the court may sentence 
him to prison o r  probation, just as it would with a defendant who has been found guilty 
under a traditional scheme.136 In  Michigan and Kentucky, a pre-sentence psychiatric 
I" See infra text accompanying notes 193-232. 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, 5 408 (Supp. 1984); GA. CODE ANN. 5 17-7-131(g) (Supp. 1985); IND. 
CODE 5 35-36-2-5 (1985); KY. REV. STAT. 5 504.130(2) (1985); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 5 'i68.36(2) 
(West 1982) (quotedsupra note 117); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. 5 314(b) (Purdon 1983); S.D. CODIFIED 
LAWS ANN. 5 23A-7-16 (Supp. 1984); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. 5 23A-7-2 (Supp. 1983); UTAH CODE 
ANN. 8 77-13-1 (Supp. 1983). The Alaska and Illinois statutes are silent about the possibility of a 
"guilty but mentally ill" plea. 
See the particular statutes cited supra note 117. 
Smith and Hall, supra note 2, at 108, Appendix A, Table C. 
13= MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 5 768.36 (3), (4) (West 1982) provide that: 
(3) If a defendant is found guilty but mentally ill or enters a plea to that effect which is 
accepted by the court, the court shall impose any sentence which could be imposed 
pursuant to law upon a defendant who is convicted of the same offense. If the 
defendant is committed to the custody of the department of corrections, he shall 
undergo further evaluation and be given such treatment as is psychiatrically indi- 
cated for his mental illness or retardation. Treatment may be provided by the 
. 
department of corrections or by the department of mental health after his transfer 
. . . . Sections 1004 and 1006 of Act No. 258 of the Public Acts of 1974 shall apply to 
the discharge of such a defendant from a facility of the department of mental 
health to which he has been admitted and shallapply to the return of such a 
defendant to the department of corrections for the balance of the defendant's 
sentence. When a treating facility designated by either the department of correc- 
tions or the department of mental health discharges such a defendant prior to the 
expiration of his sentence, that treating facility shall transmit to the parole board a 
report on the condition of the defendant which contains the clinical facts, the 
diagnosis, the course of treatment, and the prognosis for the remission of symp- 
toms, the potential for recidivism and for the danger to himself or the public, and 
recommendations for future treatment. In the event that the parole board pur- 
suant to law or administrative rules should consider him for the board shall 
consult with the treating facility at which the defendant is being treated or from 
which he has been discharged and a comparable report on the condition of the 
defendant shall be filed with the board. If he is placed on parole by the parole 
board, his treatment shall, upon recommendation df the treating facility, be made a 
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condition of parole, and failure to continue treatment except by agreement with the 
designated facility and parole board shall be a basis for the institution of parole 
violation hearings. 
(4) If a defendant who is found guilty but mentally ill is placed on probation under the 
jurisdiction of the sentencing court pursuant to law; the trial judge, upon recom- 
mendation of the center for forensic psychiatry, shall make treatment a condition 
of probation. Reports as specified by the trial judge shall be filed with the probation 
officer and the sentencing court. Failure to continue treatment, except by rigree- 
ment with the treating agency and the sentencing court, shall be a basis for the 
institution of probation viblation hearings. The period of probation shall not be for 
less than 5 years and shall not be shortened without receipt and consideration of a 
forensic psychiatric report by the sentencing court. Treatment shall be provided by 
an agency of the department of mental health, or with the approval of the sentenc- 
ing court and at individual expense, by private agencies, private physicians, or 
other mental health personnel. A psychiatric report shall be filed with the probation 
officer and the sentencing court every 3 months during the period of probation. If 
a motion on a petition to discontinue probation is made by the defendant, the 
probation officer shall request a report as specified from the center for forensic 
psychiatry or any other facility certified by department of mental health for the 
performance of forensic psychiatric evaluation. 
See also People v. McLeod, 407 Mich. 632, 661, 288 N.W.2d 909, 918 (1980) (holding that the 
apparent requirement of $ 768.36 (4) of a five-year minimum probationary period should be read as 
only "presumptive," with the sentencing court being authorized "to shorten the . . . five-year period 
. . . if any forensic psychiatric report obtained prior to sentencing or during the period of probation 
indicates that a shorter period would be appropriate"). Michigan uses the indeterminate system of 
sentencing. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. $5 769.9 (2), (3) (West 1982). 
The Indiana statute provides: 
(a) Whenever a defendant is found guilty but mentally ill at the time of the crime, or 
enters a plea to that effect that is accepted by the court, the court shall sentence him 
in the same manner as a defendant-found guilty of the offense. 
(b) If the defendant who is found guilty but mentally ill at the time of the crime is 
committed to the department of correction, he shall be further evaluated and then 
treated in such a manner as is psychiatrically indicated for his mental illness. 
Treatment may be provided by: 
(1) the department of correction; or 
(2) the department of mental health after transfer under IC 11-10-4.. 
(c) If a defendant who is found guilty but mentally ill at the time of the crime is placed 
on probation, the court may, in accordance with IC 35-38-2-2, require that he 
undergo treatment. 
IND. CODE. $ 35-36-2-5 (1985). 
The Kentucky statute provides: 
(1) The court shall sentence a defendant found guilty but mentally ill at the time of the 
offense in the same manner as a defendant found guilty. If the defendant is,found 
mentally ill at the time of sentencing, treatment shall be provided the defendant 
until he is no longer mentally ill or until expiration of his sentence, whichever 
occurs first. 
(2) Treatment shall be a condition of probation, shock probation, conditional dis- 
charge, parole or conditional release so long as the defendant is mentally ill. 
KY. REV. STAT. $ 504.150 (1985). 
Georgia law provides: 
(g)(l) Whenever a defendant is found guilty but mentally ill at the time of a felony or 
enters a plea to that effect that is accepted by the court, the court shall sentence 
him in the same manner as a defendant found guilty of the offense. A defendant 
who is found guilty but mentally ill at the time of the felony shall be evaluated by 
a psychiatrist or a licensed phychologist from the Department of Human Re- 
sources after sentencing and prior to transfer to a Department of Corrections 
facility. The Board of Human Resources shall develop appropriate rules and 
regulations for the implementation of such procedures. 
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(2) If the defendant who is found guilty but mentally ill at the time of the felony is 
not in need of immediate hospitalization, as indicated by the evaluation, then the 
defendant shall be committed to an appropriate penal facility and shall be 
further evaluated and then treated, within the limits of state funds appropriated 
therefm, in such manner as is psychiatrically indicated for his mental illness. 
(3) If at any time following the defendant's transfer to a penal facility it is deter- 
mined that a transfer to the Department of Human Resources is psychiatrically 
indicated for his mental illness, then the defendant shall be transferred to the 
Department of Human Resources pursuant to procedures set forth in regula- 
tions of the Department of Corrections and the Department of Human Re- 
sources. 
(4) If it is determined by the evaluation that the defendant found guilty but mentally 
ill at the time of the felony is in need of immediate hospitalization, then the 
defendant shall be transferred by the Department of Corrections to a mental 
health facility designated by the Department of Human Resources in accordance 
with rules and regulations of such departments. 
(h) If  a defendant who is found guilty but mentally ill at the time of a felony is placed 
on probation under the "State-wide Probation Act," Article 2 of Chapter 8 of Title 
42, the court may require that the defendant undergo available outpatient medical 
or psychiatric treatment or seek similar available voluntary inpatient treatment as a 
condition of probation. Persons required to receive such services may be charged fees by the 
p'& of the seruice. 
GA. CODE ANN. 5 17-7-131(g), (h) (Supp. 1985) (emphasis added). 
Under the Alaska statute: 
(a) If the trier of fact finds that a defendant is guilty but mentally ill, the court shall 
sentence the defendant as provided by law and shall enter the verdict of guilty but 
mentally ill as part of the judgement. 
(b) The Department of Corrections shall provide mental health treatment to a defen- 
dant found guilty but mentally ill. The treatment must continue until the defen- 
dant no longer suffers from a mental disease or  defect that causes the defendant to 
be dangerous to the public peace or safety. Subject to (c) and (d) of this section, the 
Department of Corrections shall determine the course of treatment. 
(c) When treatment terminates under (b) of this section the defendant shall be re- 
quired tp serve the remainder of the sentence imposed. 
(d) Notwithstanding any contrary provision of law, a defendant receiving treatment 
under (b) of this section may not be released on furlough or  work release under AS 
33.30.150, 33.30.250, or 33.30.260 or on parole. 
(e) Not less than 30 days before the expiration of the sentence of a defendant found 
guilty but mentally ill, the commissioner of corrections shall file a petition under AS 
47.30.700 for a screening investigation to determine the need for further treatment 
of the defendant if 
(1) the defendant is still receiving treatment under (b) of this section; and 
(2) the commissioner has good cause to believe that the defendant is suffering 
from a mental illness that causes the defendant to be dangerous to the public 
peace or safety; in this paragraph, "mental illness" has the meaning given in AS 
47.30.915. 
ALASKA STAT. § 12.47.050 (1984). 
Delaware law provides that: 
(b) In a trial under this section a defendant found guilty but mentally ill, or whose plea 
to that effect is accepted, may have any sentence imposed on him which may 
lawfully be imposed upon any defendant for the same offense. Such defendant 
shall be committed into the custody of the Department of Correction, and shall 
undergo such further evaluation and be given such immediate and temporary 
treatment as is psychiatrically indicated.   he Commissioner shall retain exclusive 
jurisdiction over such person in all matters relating to security. The Commissioner 
shall thereupon confine such person in the Delaware State Hospital. Although such 
person shall remain under the jurisdiction of the Department of Correction, deci- 
sions directly related to treatment for his mental illness shall be the joint responsi- 
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report evaluating the defendant's present mental health is required before sentencing.13? 
- - -  
bility of the Director of the Division of Alcoholism, Drug Abuse and Mental Health 
and those persons at the Delaware State Hospital who are directly responsible for 
such treatment. The Delaware State Hospital, or any other residential treatment 
facility to which the defendant is committed by the Commissioner, shall have the 
authority to discharge the defendant from the facility and return the defendant to 
the physical custody of the Commissioner whenever the facility believes that such a 
discharge is in the best interests of the defendant. The offender may, by written 
statement, refuse to take any drugs which are prescribed for treatment of his 
mental illness; except when such a refusal will endanger the life of the offender, or 
the lives or property of other persons with whom the offender has contact. 
(c) When the State Hospital or other treating facility designated by the Commissioner 
discharges an offender prior to the expiration of such person's sentence, the 
treating facility shall transmit to the Commissioner and to the Parole Board a report 
on the condition of the offender which contains the clinical facts; the diagnosis; the 
course of treatment, and prognosis for the remission of symptoms; the potential for 
the recidivism, and for danger to himself or the public; and recommendations for 
future treatment. Where an offender under this section is sentenced to the State 
Hospital or  other facility he shall not be eligible for any privileges not permitted in 
writing by the Commissioner (including escorted or unescorted on-grounds or 
off-grounds privileges) until the offender has become eligible for parole. Where 
the court finds that the offender, before completing his sentence, no longer needs 
nor could benefit from treatment for his mental illness, the offender shall be 
remanded to the Department of Correction. The offender shall have credited 
toward his sentence the time served at the State Hospital or other facility. 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, $8 408(b), (c) (Supp. 1984). 
Further, under Delaware law, 
(a) A person who has been adjudged "guilty, but mentally ill" and who during his 
incarceration is discharged from treatment may be placed on prerelease or parole 
. . 
status under the same terms and laws applicable to any other offender. ~s~chologi- 
cal or psychiatric counseling and treatment may be required as a condition for such 
status. Failure to continue treatment, except by agreement of the Department of 
Correction, shall be a basis for terminating prerelease status or instituting parole 
violation hearings. 
(b) If the report of the State Hospital or other facility recommends parole; the paroling 
authority shall within 45 days or at the expiration of the offender's minimum 
sentence, whichever is later, meet to consider the offender's request for parole. If 
the report does not recommend parole, but other laws or administrative rules of the 
Department permit parole, the paroling authority may meet to consider a parole 
request. When the paroling authority considers the offender for parole, it shall 
consult with the State Hospital or other facility at which the offender had been 
treated, or from which the offender has been discharged. 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, 5 409 (Supp. 1984). 
13' People v. McLeod, 407 Mich. at 660, 288 N.W.2d at 918; KY. REV. STAT. $ 504.140 (1985), 
which provides that: 
If a defendant is found guilty but mentally ill, the court shall appoint at least one (I)  
psychologist or psychiatrist to examine, treat and report on the defendant's mental 
condition at the time of sentencing. 
Id. No other state requires a post-conviction, pre-sentence report, although South Dakota requires a 
psychiatric evaluation of the defendant before the defendant is permitted to plead "guilty but 
mentally ill." 
South Dakota law provides: 
if a defendant charged with a felony pleads guilty but mentally ill, the court may not 
accept the plea until the defendant has been examined by a licensed psychiatrist and the 
court has examined the psychiatric reports. The court shall hold a hearing on the 
defendant's mental condition and if there is a factual basis on which the court can 
conclude that the defendant was mentally ill at the time of the offense, the plea shall be 
accepted. 
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In many states, if the court determines that probation is appropriate, psychiatric treat- 
ment must be made a condition of probation.13* 
If the defendant is sentenced to prison he will be evaluated to determine if psychiat- 
ric treatment is a p p r ~ p r i a t e . ' ~ ~  There is no  guarantee, however, that such psychiatric 
treatment will be afforded him. The American Psychiatric Association found in its study 
of the GBMI verdict that "in Michigan . . . felons have received no more treatment than 
they would have prior to the new law."140 This result was in fact predicted by one 
commentator who noted shortly after the enactment of the GBMI statute that "[elven 
before the new verdict, corrections officials were required by statute, upon an individual's 
commitment to any of their facilities, to conduct psychological testing and to recommend 
particularized placement if shown necessary."141 
Most of the data presently available on actual treatment afforded the GBMI offender 
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. 23A-7-16 (Supp. 1984). 
In Utah, the court is required to conduct a hearing to determine defendant's present mental 
state, at which it may consider relevant psychiatric testimony. After receiving this testimony, the 
court determines whether commitment to the state mental hospital is appropriate. UTAH CODE ANN. 
77-35-21.5 (Supp. 1983). Subsection (4) of that section provides that: 
The court shall in its sentence order hospitalization at the Utah state hospital or other 
suitable facility if, upon completion of the hearing and consideration of the record, the 
court finds by clear and convincing evidence that: 
(a) The defendant has a mental illness as defined by section 64-7-28(1); 
(b) Because of his mental illness the defendant poses an immediate physical danger to 
others or self, which may include jeopardizing his own or others safety, health, or 
welfare if placed in a correctional or probation setting, or lacks the ability to 
provide the basic necessities of life, such as food, clothing and shelter, if placed on 
probation; 
(c) The defendant lacks the ability to engage in a rational decision-making process 
regarding the acceptance of mental treatment as demonstrated by evidence of 
inability to weigh the possible costs and benefits of treatment; 
(d) There is no appropriate treatment alternative to a court order of hospitalization; 
and 
(e) The Utah state hospital or other suitable facility can provide the defendant with 
treatment, care, and custody that is adequate and appropriate to the defendant's 
conditions and needs. 
UTAH CODE ANN. 77-35-21.5 (4) (Supp. 1983). 
Most other states, in contrast, leave the determination of the appropriate psychiatric treatment 
to the discretion of the Department of Corrections. See supra notes 133 and 136, and infra notes 
138-39. 
'38 See, e.g., IND. CODE 35-36-2-5 (1985); KY. REV. STAT. 504.150 (1985); MICH. COMP. LAWS 
ANN. 768.36 (4) (West 1982). In Georgia, the court is authorized, but not required, to make 
probation conditional on the defendant's receiving psychiatric treatment. GA. CODE ANN. 4 17-7- 
131(h) (Supp. 1985). If the court determines that such treatment is an appropriate condition of 
probation, the defendant may be required to pay for it. Id. 
Some states appear to mandate psychiatric treatment, by using language such as "treatment 
shall be provided the defendant until he is no longer mentally ill . . . ." AUSKA STAT. 8 12.47.050(b) 
(1984); KY. REV. STAT. 504.150 (1985). Other states appear to demand less, requiring only such 
treatment "as is psychiatrically indicated." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,s 408(b) (Supp. 1984); IND. CODE 
35-36-2-5(b) (1985); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 768.36(3) (West 1982). Georgia holds out the least 
promise of treatment of any state, explicity declaring that the "guilty but mentally ill" offender shall 
be given psychiatric evaluation and treatment "within the limits of state funds appropriated there- 
for." GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131(g)(2) (Supp. 1985). 
I4O Insanity Defense Work Group, American Psychiatric Association Sfatement on the Insanity Defense, 
140 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 681, 684 (1983). 
I4l Schwartz, Moving Backward Confidently: Michigan's New Law on Criminal Responsibilily, MICH. 
STATE B.J. 847, 849 (1975) (citing MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 791.267 (West 1982) and 791.68 
(repealed 1974)). 
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comes from Michigan, which has had the longest experience with a GBMI statute. There, 
research by the Michigan Center for Forensic Psychiatry has shown that only fifty percent 
of those GBMI defendants sentenced to prison are found by the Department of Correc- 
tions to be either presently mentally ill or probably mentally ill at the time of the 
offense.14Wnly these fifty percent are eligible for psychiatric treatment. Those prisoners 
found "guilty but mentally ill" but not afforded psychiatric treatment often have special 
restrictions placed on their freedom of movement within the prison by the prison 
administration, and they may be stigmatized by their fellow prisoners as mentally ill 
making their adjustment to prison life even more difficult. If, on the other 
hand, it is determined that psychiatric treatment is appropriate, in many states such 
treatment may be provided by either the department of corrections or the department of 
mental health.144 If the GBMI prisoner is treated in prison, the care which he receives is 
minimal, because of the extremely small numbers of doctors and nurses available to 
provide treatment, and the huge number of inmates requiring treatment. The testimony 
of prison psychiatrist Dr. Dennis Jurczak at one GBMI defendant's sentencing hearing is 
most revealing. Dr. Jurczak was "the only full-time psychiatrist for a prison population of 
12,000, although he estimated that at [Michigan's] Jackson Prison alone there are proba- 
bly five to six hundred inmates out of a population of 5600 who need psychiatric 
treatment . . . Dr. Jurczak testified that there was only one nurse for an in-prison 
hospital ward of 100 psychotic or suicidal patients. Accordingly, most of the "treatment" 
given these inmates involved "crisis intervention": the administration of psychotropic 
medication and locking acutely disturbed inmates in a room. The other, less severely ' 
mentally ill prisoners were on high dosages of antipsychotic medication, but because of 
inadequate psychiatric supervision, there was no way to monitor whether the inmates 
were in fact taking the medication, nor was there any attempt to integrate the drug 
regimen with other kinds of psychiatric therapy.146 Dr. Jurczak summarized his assess- 
ment of the treatment accorded the mentally ill in Michigan's prisons by saying: 
They [the mentally ill] are really at the mercy of the rest of the prison 
population . . . . [For this defendant] it would do . . . more harm than good [to 
be turned over to the Department of Corrections]. "We do, not have the wkerewit- 
ha1 to implement the legislation regarding the treatment of mentally ill in the correctim 
system. "I4' 
Similar reports of very limited treatment of persons found "guilty but mentally ill" have 
been received from other states. "Although data on point are scanty, preliminary reports 
from Illinois and Indiana indicate that the treatment promised to recipients of the GBMI 
verdict is seldom provided."14* A majority of those found "guilty but mentally ill" in 
14' Blunt and Stock Study, supra note 81. And in another "Michigan study, over 75% of the 
defendants found GBMI received no mental treatment and the majority of the others had only 
occasional check-ups from a corrections department psychiatrist." Smith and Hall, supra note 2, at 
105 n.137. 
14= Blunt and Stock Study, supra note 81. 
GA. CODE ANN. 5 17-7-131(g) (Supp. 1985); IND. CODE 3 35-36-2-5(b) (1985); MICH. COMP. 
LAWS ANN. 8 768.36 (3) (West 1982). In Delaware and Utah, GBMI defendants are committed only to 
the state mental hospital. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, 8 408(b) (Supp. 1984); UTAH CODE ANN. 8 
77-35-21.5(4) (Supp. 1983). In contrast, in Alaska a GBMI defendant may only be treated within the 
facilities of the Department of Corrections. ALASKA STAT. 5 12.47.050 (1984). 
la Peopk v. McLeod, 407 Mich. at 667 n.5, 288 N.W.2d at 921 n.5 (Levin, J., concurring). 
Id. 
1 4 ~  Id. (quoting Dr. Jurczak) (emphasis in original). 
National Center for State Courts, Institute on Mental Disability and the Law, Proposal for 
National Institute of Justice funding for "The 'Guilty But Mentally Ill' Experiment in Eight States: 
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Illinois are housed with the general prison population, with less than forty percent 
receiving "treatment" at the sole Department of Corrections hospital. No Illinois GBMI 
defendant has ever been committed to the Department of Mental Health.149 Interestingly, 
a proposed GBMI bill in Kansas was "shelved because of the significant capital costs which 
the state would incur in providing the mental facilities for this type of criminal defen- 
dant."lS0 
Even when GBMI prisoners are given psychiatric treatment in a state mental hospi- 
tal,lS1 their treatment is only incidental to their punishment. Unlike insanity acquittees, 
who must be released from confinement once it is determined that they have recovered 
- their sanity,lS2 GBMI prisoners who regain their sanity are returned to the prison 
population to serve out the remainder of their prison term.'53 
D. The Guilg But Mentally Ill Statutes Are Uncmtitutional 
Where does this examination of the structure and actual operation of the GBMI 
statutes lead? In this section, it will be argued that the GBMI statutes are unconstitutional, 
at least for some persons convicted ueder them, in two major respects. First, they fail to 
fulfill their promise of providing needed psychiatric treatment to the mentally ill of- 
fender, and thus deny the mentally ill defendants who are found "guilty but mentally ill" 
their constitutional right to treatment. Second, the laws encourage triers of fact to reach 
compromise verdicts by failing adequately to distinguish between "mental illness" and 
"insanity," and, at the same time, holding out the illusory promise of combining treatment 
with public protection if the defendant is found "guilty but mentally ill." The substantial 
possibility that such a compromise verdict may be reached effectively deprives a defen- 
dant of his constitutional right to present an insanity defense, and denies him both the 
due process and equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. 
1. Denial of the Right to Treatment 
In recent years a growing number of state and federal courts have enunciated a 
constitutional right to mental health treatment. This right emerged in the early 1970's as 
an important check on the power of the state to commit involuntarily persons deemed 
. - 
mentally ill and dangerousto themselves or others. In the landmark case of Wyatt v. 
An Empirical and Descriptive Analysis," at 8 (December 1, 1982) [hereinafter The GBMI Ex- 
periment]. 
149 According to an article in the Chicago Tribune: 
More than half of the prisoners found guilty but mentally ill are scattered throughout 
the Illinois prison system's general population, said Stephen Hardy, director of the 
Menard Psychiatric Center. No inmate who has been found guilty but mentally ill has 
ever been transferred to the Department of Mental Health, he said, and, at present, 
only 28 of the 72 inmates incarcerated under the law are housed in the psychiatric 
center at Menard, the only prison psychiatric hospital in the state. 
Chicago Tribune (Perspective), September 4, 1983, p. 5. See supra note 112. 
Is0 The GBMI Experiment, supra note 148, at 8. 
Is1 The laws of the Delaware, Georgia, Indiana, Michigan, and Utah authorize either the initial 
committment or transfer to a state mental hospital of a GBMI defendant. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,s 
408(b) (Supp. 1984); GA. ANN. CODE 17-7-131(g) (Supp. 1984); IND. CODE 5s 35-36-2-5(b), 
11-10-42 (1985); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 768.36(3) (West 1982); UTAH CODE ANN. 77-35- 
21.5(4) (Supp. 1983). 
m2 PeOplev. McQuilhn, 392 Mich. at 538,221 N.W.2d at 581; ALASKA STAT. 12.47.090 (1984); . 
GA. CODE ANN. 8 17-7-131 (Supp. 1985); IND. CODE 35-36-2-4 (1985); KY. REV. STAT. $5 202A.026, 
504.030 (1985); UTAH CODE ANN. 77-14-5 (Supp. 1983). 
Is3 ALASKA STAT. 12.47.050(c) (1984); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,s 5.408(b), (c) (Supp. 1984); KY. 
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Sti~kney,'~~ which addressed the treatment rights of the civilly committed mentally re- 
tarded and mentally ill, it was held that, "When patients are . . . committed for treatment 
purposes they unquestionably have a constitutional right to receive' such individual 
treatment as will give each of them a pealistic opportunity to be cured or to improve his or 
her mental condition."15s In Rouse v. Cameron,1s6 the court invoked constitutional consid- 
erations of equal protection and due process to declare, as a matter of statutory construc- 
tion, that the District of Columbia statute providing for mandatory commitment of 
insanity acquittees should be read to include a "statutory 'right to treatment.' " The court 
ruled that mandatory commitment under the statute was "permissible [only] because of its 
humane therapeutic goals. Had appellant been found criminally responsible, he could 
have been confined a year, at most, however dangerous he might have been. He has been 
confined four years and an end is not in ~ight."'~'The court also noted that "[slince this 
difference rests only on the need for treatment," the government's failure to provide 
adequate psychiatric treatment raised possible violations of the due process and equal 
protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment, and the cruel and unusual punishment 
clause of the eighth amendment.IS8 
The Supreme Court, while unwilling to find a general right to treatment of the 
mentally ill,159 has declared that prison inmates are entitled to receive treatment for their 
medical needs. InEstelle v. Gamble,160 the Court found that because "the denial of medical 
care may result in pain and suffering which no one suggests would serve any penological 
purpose . . . we conclude that the deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of 
prisoners constitutes the 'unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain' . . . proscribed by the 
Eighth Amendment."IG1 Recent cases have held that this right of prisoners to medical 
treatment applies equally to prisoners suffering from physical and mental illnesses.162 
Against these constitutional requirements, the psychiatric treatment accorded GBMI 
prisoners has proven inadequate, if not altogether illusory. First, not all of the GBMI 
statutes expressly guarantee treatment.163 Although some statutes do use mandatory 
language, that is, "the defendantshall be treated," others provide only that "the defendant 
. . . shall undergo further evaluation and be given such treatment as is psychiatrically 
REV. STAT. 5 504.150(1) (1985); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 8 768.36(3) (West 1982); UTAH CODE ANN. 5
77-35-21.5 (Supp. 1983). See also Smith and Hall, supa note 2, at 90. 
Is' 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971). 
Id. at 784. 
Is6 373 F.2d 451, 455 (D.C. Cir. 1966). 
Is7 In Jones v. United States, 466 U.S. 354 (1983), the Supreme Court held that an insanity 
acquittee could be confined indefinitely, until he had met the burden of proving that he was no 
longer mentally ill or dangerous, even though, if he had been found guilty of the crime charged, his 
sentence would have long since expired. A contrary result was reached by the California Supreme 
Court inIn re Moye, 22 Cal. 3d 457,584 P.2d 1097, 149 Cal. Rptr. 491 (1978). That court held that 
"well established constitutional principles of equal protection require that the duration of institu- 
tional confinement of such persons cannot exceed the maximum term for the underlying offense," 
unless the state seeks extended commitment under the civil commitment statute.Id. at 460,584 P.2d 
at 1099, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 493. Similar results have been obtained by legislative action in Oregon, OR. 
REV. STAT. 5 161.327 (1983); and Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 5 53a-13 (West 1972 & Supp. 
1983). 
373 F.2d at 453. 
Is9 O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 573 (1975). 
160 429 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1976). 
IS' Id. 
162 Bowring v. Godwin, 551 F.2d 44,47 (4th Cir. 1977); see also Ohlinger v. Watson, 652 F.2d 
475, 778-79 (9th Cir. 1980). 
lM For a discussion of this issue, see supra text accompanying notes 138-39. 
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indicated for his mental illness or retardation.""j4 Yet when'the GBMI statute has been 
upheld, as it was by the Michigan Supreme Court in People v .  McLeod,lG5 the rationale for 
sustaining it has been that the legislative purpose in creating this new verdict was to assure 
supervised mental health treatment and care for persons convicted under the laws of the 
state found to be suffering from mental i1lne~s.I~~ 
Second, an examination of the mental health treatment presently accorded those 
found "guilty but mentally ill" shows that that legislative purpose has not been fulfilled. As 
noted earlier, less than forty percent of the Illinois GBMI defendants, and between 
twenty-five and fifty percent of the Michigan GBMI defendants, receive any psychiatric 
treatment at all.167 At the same time, however, their freedom of movement within the 
prison may be restricted, and they may be stigmatized by the label of "mentally ill" without 
having received any of the benefits of psychiatric treatment.lG8 At least one court has 
noted that the long-lasting injury to reputation occasioned by being labelled "mentally ill" 
may be even worse than that caused by a criminal conviction alone.lGg Thus, far from 
obtainingspecial help for their mental problems, these GBMI prisoners are actually worse 
off than if they had simply been found guilty. 
But even those prisoners who are determined to be suitable candidates for psychiatric 
treatment fare poorly. If they are retained for treatment within the prison, the care they 
receive is manifestly inadequate, as was evidenced by the testimony of Michigan prison 
psychiatrist Dr. Dennis Jurczak.170 No doctor, no matter how dedicated, can give adequate 
psychiatric treatment to a population of five to six hundred people. Inevitably, the 
psychiatrist must rely heavily on psychotropic medication as a means .of limiting and 
controlling serious psychiatric  breakdown^.'^' Hence, "[tloday, drugs are the most com- 
mon form of behavior modification and restraint in prisons."ln This is not to say that 
drugs are not an extremely important tool for the psychiatrist to use in treating the 
mentally ill. Psychotropic medication has made possible phenomenal advances in psychi- 
atric treatment and has frequently been responsible for the cures or remissions of serious 
mental illness which would have been unthinkable only thirty years ago. At the same time, 
it must be recognized that drugs are an adjunct to psychiatric therapy, not a substitute for 
it. 
While those GBMI prisoners transferred tb a state mental hospital for treatment fare 
much better than their confrkres who remain in prison, they are still at a disadvantage 
when compared to persons acquitted on grounds of insanity. Insanity acquittees must be 
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 5 768.36 (3) (West 1982). Similar language is found in the Illinois 
statute: 
If the court imposes a sentence of imprisonment upon a defendant who has been found 
guilty but mentally ill, the defendant shall be committed to the Department of Correc- 
tions, which shall cause periodic inquiry and examination to be made concerning the 
nature, extent, continuance, and treatment of the defendant's mental illness. The 
Department of Corrections shall provide such psychiatric, psychological, or other 
counseling and treatment for the defendant as it determines necessary. 
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-2-6(b) (Smith-Hurd 1982 & Supp. 1985). 
407 Mich. 632, 288 N.W.2d 909 (1980). 
Id. at 663, 288 N.W.2d at 919 (emphasis added). 
16? See supra notes 142 and 149. 
Blunt and Stock Study, supra note 81. 
Bartley v. Kremens, 402 F. Supp. 1039, 1046 (E.D. Pa. 1975). 
See supra note 145 and accompanying text. 
1" Jarvik, Drugs Used in the Treatment of Psychiatric Disorders, L. GOODMAN & A. GILMAN, THE 
PHARMACOLOGICAL BASIS OF THERAPEUTICS 133 (1970). 
Forer, The Prisoner and the Psychiatrist, 31 EMORY L.J. 61, 66-67 (1982) [hereinafter cited as 
Forer]. 
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released as soon as they are found to be sane, while a GBMI prisoner who is restored to 
sanity is returned to prison for the remainder of his sentence. 
Also unlike insanity acquittees, GBMI prisoners are not eligible for a treatment 
program which provides for their gradual reintegration into the community. Yet this type 
of step-by-step release is precisely the kind of program which holds out the greatest hope 
for the successful maintenance of mental health after discharge. "The therapeutic ideal 
calls for allowing patients more and more responsibility for their own actions and judg- 
ments, with correlative diminishing restrictions and controls, which inevitably means 
accepting greater or less security risk."173 Unfortunately, "therapy and security are largely 
inconsistent objectives," and in prison security almost always wins.174 
When measured against the constitutional requirement of mental health treatment, 
then, the treatment afforded GBMI prisoners is largely inadequate. To the extent that 
any GBMI inmate who is in fact presently mentally ill ivdenied "such individual treatment 
as will give him . . . a realistic opportunity to be cured or to improve his . . . mental 
condition,"175 he is being denied his constitutional right to treatment and is subjected to 
cruel and unusual punishment. "It is repugnant. . . to place a seriously mentally infirm or 
retarded person in a punitive setting or to impose other forms of punishment."176 Yet 
many GBMI defendants receive no psychiatric treatment at all, and, in addition, are 
stigmatized by correctional officials and their fellow prisoners as a result of their GBMI 
convictions. The testimony of Dr. Jurczak indicates without any doubt that the quality of 
care received by the mentally ill in Michigan's prisons receiving treatment is so inadequate 
as to "shock the conscience."177 
Indeed, such treatment raises serious ethical questions about the doctors who are 
providing this care.176 Among the Principles of Medical Ethics adopted by the American 
Medical Association, two are pertinent here: 
The principle objective of the medical profession is to render service to 
humanity with respect for the dignity of man. Physicians should merit the 
confidence of patients entrusted to their care, rendering to each a full mea- 
sure of service and devotion. 
A physician should not dispose of his services under terms or conditions 
which tend to interfere with or impair the free and complete exercise of his 
medical judgment and skill or tend to cause a deterioration of the quality of 
medical care. 
Unquestionably the pressures of practicing medicine in the prison environment 
make it extremely difficult for a prison psychiatrist to meet his ethical obligations. Under 
the conditions in Michigan's prisons described by Dr. Jurczak, it is impossible for the 
psychiatrist to "render . . . to each [inmate] a full measure of service and devotion."1s0 
Instead, because of the security needs of the institution, and the overwhelming weight of 
lT3 Weihofen, Institutional Treatment of Persons Acquitted By Reason of Insanity, 38 TEX. L. REV. 849, 
853 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Weihofen]. 
l" Id. at 850, 854. 
lT5 Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, 784 (M.D. Ala. 1971). 
lT6 Gostin, supra note 64, at 107. 
lT7 CJ Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) (use of stomach pumping to obtain 
contents of suspect's stomach "shocks the conscience" and constitutes an illegal seizure). 
lT8 Cf. O'Connor v. Donaldson. 422 U.S. 563 (1975). 
ITS See generally Principles of Medical Ethics, in AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, PINIONS AND 
REPORTS OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL (1979) [hereinafter cited as Prinn'ples of Medical Ethics]. 
lSO Id. 
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the number of seriously mentally ill prisoners, the nature of the psychiatric practice itself 
is transformed:lS1 
The patient's physical and mental health is subordinated to considerations of 
custody. Too frequent applications for medical or psychiatric service are 
interpreted as malingering. Aggressive behavior is punished as an offense, 
whereas a therapeutic approach might regard such behavior as a hopeful 
sign. Is" 
Thus the free exercise of the doctor's medical judgment1" is severely impaired, and the 
GBMI prisoner receives inadequate psychiatric treatment. 
When this level of treatment is compared with the type of treatment which the 
prisoner would have received had he been found not guilty by reason of insanity, and 
thus had been eligible for a gradual, phased reintegration into society as his mental health 
improved, there is a violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend- 
mentIs4 Further, 
[i]t has never been determined that sentence-serving convicts suffer from 
different mental illnesses from persons who are civilly committed . . . . [Slince 
criminal status is irrelevant to the capability to treat, it should be irrelevant to 
the right to treatment. Mentally ill convicts are entitled to treatment equal to 
that received by civilly-committed patients. Whether one compares the statis- 
tics on average length of confinement or the relative stigma attaching from 
confinement, theinescapable conclusion is that "segregated" treatment of any 
class of mental patient in a maximum security facility is inherently unequal, 
inherently discriminatory, and inherently unjust.lsj 
Thus, a large number, if not all, of those GBMI prison inmates presently incarcerated 
without adequate psychiatric treatment have been denied their fundamental constitu- 
tional right to treatment and to the equal protection of the laws, when compared both 
with insanity acquittees and with the "civilly" mentally ill. 
Yet so far, the various courts who have been asked to rule on this issue have failed to 
provide any remedy. Michigan and Indiana courts, for example, have held that the 
proper remedy for an asserted denial of the treatment on which the GBMI statute was 
premised is to secure a writ of mandate against the Department of Correctionslsu of to 
bring a federal civil rights action,Is7 not to declare the statute unconstitutional.18s To date 
no writs of mandate have issued.'89 In response to their apparent inability to gain relief 
from Michigan state courts, a number of GBMI inmates have filed a federal class action 
suit, alleging that they have not received the psychiatric evaluation and treatment guaran- 
teed by the Michigan GBMI statute, in violation of the due process clause of the four- 
Weihofen, supra note 173, at 860-61. 
lsz Id. at 861. 
la3 See generaUy Prinn'ples of Medical Ethics, supra note 179. 
See supra notes 50 and 52 and accompanying text. 
Iss Moms, "Criminality" and the Right to Treatment, 36 U .  CHI. L. REV. 784, 798 (1969). 
See,e.g., Stader v. State,453 N.E.2d 1032,1036 (Ind. App. 1983); People v. Toner, 125 Mich. 
App. 439, 439-41, 336 N.W.2d 22, 23 (1983); People v. Willsie, 96 Mich. App. 350, 354-55, 292 
N.W.2d 145, 147 (1980); People v. Tenbrink, 93 Mich. App. 326,331,287 N.W.2d 223,225 (1979); 
People v. Soma, 88 Mich. App. 351, 362, 276 N.W.2d 892, 897 (1979). 
Is' Stader v. State, 453 N.E.2d 1032, 1036 (Ind. App. 1983). 
I" Id; see also People v. McLeod, 407 Mich. at 655, 288 N.W.2d at 915. 
lss Interim Institute Report, sups note 16. at 46. 
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teenth amendment and the eighth amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual 
punishment.lgO 
An Illinois court has expressly ruled that those found "guilty but mentally ill" have no 
constitutional right to treatment, since unlike insanity acquittees and other civil com- 
mitees, persons found "guilty but mentally ill" are not involuntarily committed at all, but 
are being incarcerated as punishment for the crimes they have committed.1s1 As was 
explained by the court: "Persons found guilty but mentally ill . . . are incarcerated for 
their crimes, not their mental condition."lg2 
2. The GBMI Statutes Encourage Unconstitutional Compromise Verdicts 
The disparity between the treatment accorded insanity acquittees and the treatment 
afforded the GBMI prisoners is particularly striking in light of the very fuzzy distinction 
between the two groups made by the GBMI statutes at the trial stage. As noted earlier, the 
statutory definitions of "mental illness" and "insanity" are conceptually very close and, to a 
considerable degree, overlapping. Thus, Michigan law defines "mental illness" as a "sub- 
stantial disorder of thought or mood which significantly impairs judgment, behavior, 
capacity to recognize reality, or ability to cope with the ordinary demands of life,"lS3 
Following the Model Penal Code test, a person is deemed insane "if, as a result of mental 
illness . . . or mental retardation . . . that person lacks substantial capacity either to 
appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements 
of law."1g4 But because there is little distinction between illness that significantly impairs 
judgment - mental illness -and illness that impairs a defendant's capacity to appreciate 
the wrongfulness of his conduct - insanitylg5 - these definitions in effect "confer upon 
the trier of fact unstructured and unlimited discretion to determine whether an offense 
has been committed."lg6 
Even more confusing to the jury are the distinctions between "mental illness" and 
"insanity" made by Alaska and Pennsylvania law. Under Alaska law, a defendant is 
"insane" if, at the time of the offense, he was "unable, as a result of a mental disease or 
defect, to appreciate the nature and quality of that conduct," but the defendant is only 
"mentally ill" if, at the time of the offense, he lacked "the substantial capacity either to 
appreciate the wrongfulness of that conduct or to conform that conduct to the require- 
ments of law . . . ."Ig7 The distinction made by Pennsylvania law is similarly oblique. In 
Im Gorton v. Johnson, 100 F.R.D. 801,803 (E.D. Mich. 1984). The court has limited the class 
action issue to the question of whether the state defendants have: 
devised and put into practice a policy, process, and procedure that can adequately give 
"further evaluation" and "such treatment as is psychiatrically indicated" to persons who 
have been determined to be "guilty but mentdly ill" . . . and if they have not, is this 
failure a violation of due process and the prohibition against cruel and unusual 
punishment . . . . 
Id. (quoting MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 5 768.36 (West 1982)). As this article went to press, the case was 
still in thediscovery stage. 
People v. Marshall, 114 111. App. 3d 217, 223, 448 N.E.2d 969, 980 (1983). 
Id .  
lg3 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 5 330.1400a (West 1980). 
lW MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 5 768.21a (West 1982). Kentucky and Indiana law draw similar 
distinctions between "insanity" and "mental illness." See supra notes 123-26. 
Is5 Robitscher and Haynes, I n  D$me of the Insanity D$me, 31 EMORY L.J. 9, 17 (1982). 
lg6 In People v. Ramsey, 89 Mich. App. 468,472,280 N.W.2d. 565,566 (1979), the defendant's 
argument to this effect was flatly rejected by the court, which stated that "[a] reading of the statute 
refutes defendant's argument." Id.  at 472, 280 N.W.2d at 567. 
See supra text accompanying notes 127-28. 
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that jurisdiction a defendant is "insane" if "[alt the time of the commission of the act, the 
- 
defendant was laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to 
know the nature and quality of the act he was doing or, if he did know it, that he did not 
know he was doing what was wrong." If, however, the defendant, "as a result of mental 
disease or defect, lack[ed] substantial capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his 
conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law," then he is only 
"mentally ill."lg8 By defining "insanity" in accordance with the traditional M'NagI~ten test 
of insanity and "mental illness" in accordance with the Model Penal Code test for 
insanity,lg9 the Alaska and Pennsylvania legislatures have adopted a narrow view of the 
circumstances in which an insanity defense is appropriate,'OO and have demonstrated an 
evident preference that, when in doubt about the defendant's mental state at the time of 
the crime, the jury should resolve its doubts in favor of the verdict of "guilty but mentally 
ill," even though.in many other jurisdictions such a defendant would be legally insane. 
Many  defendants have attacked on equal protection grounds the rationality of 
this purported distinction between a state of mental disturbance that renders the defen- 
dant "guilty but mentally ill" and mental disturbance sufficient to permit his acquittal on 
grounds of insanity. These challenges, however, have been repeatedly rejected by the 
In People v. S~rna,'~' for example, a Michigan appellate court declared that the 
legislature had acted rationally, based on "a need to make experimental classifications 'in a 
practical and troublesome area,' " in establishing "an intermediate category to deal with 
situations where a defendant's mental illness does not deprive him of substantial capacity 
sufficient to satisfy the insanity test but does warrant treatment in addition to incarcera- 
tion:.'03 The court rejected the defendant's argument that the legislative definitions of 
"insanity" and "mental illness" amounted to a distinction without a difference, declaring, 
"the fact that these distinctions may not appear clear-cut does not warrant a finding of no 
rational basis to make thern."'O4 Yet the effect of this "not . . . clear-cut" distinction 
between one who was insane at the time of an otherwise criminal act and one who was 
"only" mentally ill must be to make it possible, if not likely, for a court or jury to resolve 
doubts about the defendant's insanity by picking the "middle ground of a GBMI verdict. 
This compromise resolution is particularly likely in a jurisdiction like Michigan which 
requires that if a jury so requests, it be given an instruction explaining the alternative 
dispositions of a defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity and a defendant found 
"guilty but mentally ill."'05 
198 See supra text accompanying notes 129-31. 
lgg See supra note 48. 
ZW See supra text accompanying note 44. 
201 See, e.g., Taylor v. State, 440 N.E.2d 1109, 11 12-13 (Ind. 1982); People v. Jackson, 80 Mich. 
App. 244, 246, 263 N.W.2d 44, 45 (1977). 
202 88 Mich. App. 351, 276 N.W.2d 892 (1979). 
203 Id. at 360, 276 N.W.2d at 896 (citing McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 270 (1973)). 
204 Id. 
205 People v. Delaughter, 124 Mich. App. 356, 361, 335 N.W.2d 37, 39 (1983); ~ e o $ e  V. 
Thomas, 96 Mich. App. 210,222,292 N.W.2d 523,528-29 (Mich. App. 1980). Michigan patternjury 
instructions provide two alternative instructions which may be given to the jury concerning the 
consequences of an insanity acquittal, and one instruction which addresses the consequences of a 
verdict of "guilty but mentally ill." These instructions are as follows: 
[Form No.404. Disposition of [Insane] Defendant] 
If you find the defendant committed the act but was not criminally responsible at the 
time, then he is not guilty by reason of insanity. If you make such a decision, the 
defendant will be immediately committed to the custody of the Center for Forensic 
Psychiatry for evaluation of his present mental condition. 
[Form No. 405. Disposition of [Insane] Defendant (Alternative)] 
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Substantial empirical evidence exists to support the likelihood of such juror  com- 
promise. I n  Rita James Simon's work with mock juries considering the insanity defense,206 
she found a number of jurors who would have liked the option df finding the defendant 
"guilty, but in need of medical treatment,"'07 as a way of "easing the choice between 
acquitting the defendant on grounds of insanity and finding him guilty. . . . Tha t  kind of 
verdict would permit the jurors to condemn the defendant's behavior and  at the same 
time to grant him a special dispensation," distinguishing him from "the ordinary crimi- 
nal.'*208 
(1) If you find the defendant committed the act but was not criminally responsible at 
the time, then he is not guilty by reason of insanity. If you make such a decision, the 
defendant will be immediately committed to the custody for the Center for Forensic 
Psychiatry for a period not to exceed sixty days. 
(2) During that time, the statute directs that the Center thoroughly examine and 
evaluate the present mental condition of the defendant in order to reach an opinion as 
to whether he is mentally ill and requires medical treatment. 
(3) Within the sixty-day period, the Center will file a report with the Court, prosecuting 
attorney and defense counsel. If the report states that the person is not mentally ill or 
does not require treatment, the defendant shall be discharged [from custody]. 
(4) If the report finds that the person is mentally ill and does require treatment, the 
Court may [wilq direct the prosecuting attorney to file a petition with the Probate Court 
for an order of hospitalization or an order of admission to a clinical facility. If the Court 
so directs, the Center may retain the person pending such hearing. 
(5) If, after a hearing before the Probate Court, the defendant is found not to be 
mentally ill or not to be a person requiring treatment, the defendant shall be discharged 
[from custody]. 
(6) However, if the person is ordered hospitalized, admitted to a facility or otherwise to 
receive treatment, he shall not be discharged or placed on leave without prior consulta- 
tion with the Center for Forensic Psychiatry. Once hospitalized, the defendant will be 
hospitalized until his mental condition is such that he no longer is judged to require 
treatment. 
[Form No. 407. Disposition of Defendant Found Guilty but Mentally Ill] 
(14) If you find the defendant committed the crime while responsible but mentally ill, 
then you may return a verdict of guilty but mentally ill. This verdict may be of the crime 
charged [or any lesser included offense]. 
(15) In most respects a verdict of guilty but mentally ill is the same as a verdict of guilty. 
The defendant may be imprisoned for the same period of time as he would if he were 
found guilty. [Alternatively, he could be placed on probation for a period of time the 
same as or greater than he would be if found guilty.] The distinction is that the verdict 
of guilty but mentally ill imposes upon the Department of Corrections an obligation to 
provide appropriate psychiatric treatment during the period of imprisonment or while 
the defendant is on probation. 
G. GILLESPIE, 2 MICHIGAN CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 380-82 (2d ed. 1978 & 1984 Cumulative 
Supplement). 
Alaska goes one step further than Michigan and requires that the jury be advised of the 
alternative dispositions of a defendant found "guilty but mentally ill" and a defendant found "not 
guilty by reason of insanity." ALASKA STAT. § 12.47.040(c) (1984). Pennsylvania also requires that the 
jury be instructed on the consequences of an insanity acquittal. Commonwealth v. Mulgrew, 475 Pa. 
271, 277-78, 380 A.2d 349, 352 (1977). 
To avoid the constitutional questions which would be raised by invading the sanctity of the 
jury room, Simon used jurors drawn from actual jury rolls in Chicago, St. Louis, and Minneapolis. 
The juries heard tapes of an insanity defense trial. The trials varied in the definition of insanity 
employed, the detail of psychiatric testimony presented, and in whether or not the jury was told the 
co&iequences of convicuon and acquittal. R. SIMON, THE JURY AND THE DEFENSE OFINSANITY 213-14 
(1967) [hereinafter cited as R. SIMON]. 
207 Id.  at 96. 
208 Id. at 178. 
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Simon's work has been borne out in the real world as well. In United States v. Patrick,"# 
the defendant was charged with first degree murder in the stabbing death of his mother. 
His defense was insanity due  to LSD-induced hallucinations. After deliberating for nearly 
a day, the jury informed the court that it was deadlocked, with ten jurors in favor of a 
verdict of guilty, and two jurors in favor of a not guilty by reason of insanity verdict. 
After the court urged the jury to continue its deliberations in hopes of  reaching agree- 
ment,S0 the jury asked the court if it could " 'make a recommendation of psychiatric 
treatment for the defendant along with a verdict of murder in the second degree.' "211 
T h e  court stated that it could. Fifteen minutes later the jury rendered such a verdict. In 
reversing the defendant's conviction, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeal focused on the 
critical importance of keeping separate the questions of a defendant's criminal responsi- 
bility and the appropriate disposition if he  was found responsible. T h e  court stressed that 
"where the sole issue [in a case] is the question of criminal responsibility, the potential for 
undermining a jury verdict by allowing a recommendation of psychiatric treatment is 
obvious." T h e  court emphasized that the judgment made in an  insanity case is a moral one 
- "whether a person was sufficiently able to control his behavior so that he  may justly be 
held responsible for committing an  anti-social act." According to the court, a jury inquiry 
into the consequences of a particular verdict would undermine their ability to make that 
moral judgment, and thus would be inappr~priate .~" 
Courts have also frequently recognized the difficulty which jurors may have in 
acquitting a defendant on grounds of insanity when he  has committed a particularly 
heinous act.213 T h e  difficulty that a trier of fact may have in properly assessing whether 
the defendant was "merely" mentally ill o r  truly insane at  the time of the offense is 
compounded by the passage of time and the frequent use of psychiatric treatment, 
including psychotropic drugs, to "stabilize a mentally ill defendant so that he  is calm 
enough to be found competent to stand Thus, by the time these defendants do  
stand trial, they often convey at  least the appearance of normality, making it more 
209 494 F.2d 1150 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
210 Id. at 1153. The court instructed the jury in accordance with the now-disfavored "Allen" 
charge. Id. at 1153, n.4. 
211 Id. at 1153 (quoting trial court transcript at 531). 
212 Id. at 1154 (footnotes omitted). 
213 See, e.g., United States v. Bennett, 460 F.2d 872, 881 (D.C. Cir. 1972). Cf. Beck v. Alabama, 
447 U.S. 625, 627 (1980) (court struck down Alabama's death penalty statute, which prohibited the 
jury from being instructed on the crime of felony murder as a lesser included offense of robbery- 
intentional murder, which carried a mandatory penalty of death). In Beck, the court commented 
upon the reality ofjury concern with letting dangerous individuals escape all criminal responsibility: 
Jurors are not expected to come into the jury box and leave behind all that their human 
experience. has taught them. The increasing crime rate in this country is a source of 
concern to all Americans. To expect ajury to ignore this reality and to find a defendant 
innocent and thereby set him free when the evidence established beyond doubt that he 
is milty of some violent crime requires of ourjuries clinical detachment from the reality 
- .  
of human experience . . . ." 
447 U.6. at 642 (citing Jacobs v. State, 361 So. 2d 640,657-62 (Ala. 1978) (Shores, J., dissenting), cert. 
h i e d ,  439 US. 1122 (1979)). 
Turner and Omstein, supra note 2, at 43. This problem of "synthetic sanity" has recently 
prompted several state supreme courts to hold that a defendant may not be forcibly medicated in 
order to be competent to stand trial if to do so would deprive the jury of the opportunity to observe 
his demeanor as it was at the time of the offense. See, e.g, Commonwealth v. Louraine, 390 Mass. 28, 
36-37, 453 N.E.2d 437-46 (1983); State v. Hayes, 118 N.H. 458, 389 A.2d 1379, 1382 (1978). 
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difficult for them to persuade a court or jury of their insanity at the time of the offense. 
"When the defendant is on drugs, the jury never gets to see him as he was at the time of 
the incident in question, or as he was when the psychiatrist examined him out of court.""15 
The combination of all these factors - the lack of a clearly articulated distinction 
between mental illness and insanity, the defendant's potentially misleading demeanor at 
trial, and the conflicting desires of the trier of fact to provide treatment and at the same 
time keep violent individuals off the streets - can easily lead a court or jury to elect the 
GBMI verdict even when substantial evidence is presented of the defendant's insanity."= 
This verdict is attractive because, by convicting the defendant, the jury can condemn his 
behavior and keep a possibly dangerous individual in custody.   he jury may believe, 
however, that by also finding the defendant mentally ill, their verdict will ensure special 
treatment and will carry a lesser stigma than a regular "guilty" verdict."'? 
It is axiomatic that there is a fundamental distinction between therapy and punish- 
ment: 
Therapy is not a response to person who is at fault. Therapy is normally 
associated with compassion for what one undergoes, not resentment for what 
one has illegitimately done . . . . 
[Wlith therapy, unlike punishment, we do not seek to deprive the person 
of something acknowledged as a good, but seek rather to help and to benefit 
the individual who is suffering by ministering to his illness in the hope that 
the person can be cured . . . . 
[Tlhe conceptions of "paying a debt" or "having a debt forgiven" or 
pardoning have no place in a system of the rap^."^ 
Under the GBMI verdict, the distinction between therapy .and punishment is impermissi- 
bly blurred. The fact that the. GBMI verdict comes into play only when a defendant 
invokes the insanity defense, and is not made applicable to defendants who do not assert 
mental incapacity as a defense to a crime although they may in fact be mentally ill, is 
evidence of a legislative purpose to punish, rather than treat, individuals who assert a 
defense of in~anity."~ The GBMI statute accomplishes the police power goal of keeping 
dangerous people off the streets, but disguises this purpose in the rhetoric of treatment. 
The GBMl verdict's "moral sleight-of-hanCW0 improperly confuses treatment with pun- 
ishment, and makes it possible for judges and juries to opt for a GBMI verdict, rather 
than a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity, under the mistaken impression that they 
will thereby guarantee psychiatric treatment, as well as lengthy incarceration, for the 
mentally ill offender. 
Currently available data on the possibility of this type of jury compromise is 
equivocal. In Michigan, the number of insanity acquittals has remained relatively constant 
before and after the enactment of the GBMI verdict. Between 1967 and 1974 an average 
Turner and Ornstein, supra note 2, at 43. 
'I6 Judge Barrington Parker, who presided over the Hinckley trial, has assailed the "guilty but 
mentally ill" verdict as " 'an open invitation to the jury to return a compromise verdict. . . .' " Lauter, 
A Refan ofthe Insanity Plea Likely, 5 NAYL L. J. 5 (April 25, 1983) (quoting Judge Parker). 
'I7 Grostic, Th C m t i f u t w m l ~  of Michigan's Guilty But Mentally Ill Verdict, 12 J.L. REFORM 188, 
196 (1978). 
H. MORRIS, ON GUILT AND INNOCENCE 38-39 (1976). 
See supra text accompanying note 112. 
220 ABA, Report to the House of Delegates, supra note 62, at 9. 
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of forty persons was acquitted on grounds of insanity each year, although there were 
seventy-eight in 1974, the year before the GBMI verdict was e n a ~ t e d . ~ ~  In  1975, the first 
year in which the GBMI verdict was law, the number of insanity acquittals fell to 
thirty-three,r29ut since then it has risen to an  average of fifty-four per year for the 
period 1976-1982.r23 Given that only forty percent of the GBMI verdicts are the result of 
a trial, and that the number of successful insanity pleas has been fairly constant before 
and after the passage of the GBMI law, it has been argued that the GBMI verdict has not 
undercut the ability of criminal defendants to present a  successful^ insanity defenseaZZ4 
This argument, however, overlooks two critical factors. First, the legal definition of 
insanity was itself changed in 1975, from a variation of M'Naghtenm plus "irrestible 
impulse"r26 before the GBMI verdict was enacted, to the A.L.I. Model Penal Code 
definition'" thereafter.2" Second, the number of pre-trial referrals for psychiatric evalua- 
tion of defendants who wished to assert an insanity defense skyrocketed after 1975,"20 
rising from 401 in 1976 to 1,122 in 1980."0 Both these factors - a more liberal definition 
of insanity and a much greater number of defendants asserting an insanity defense and 
receiving a pre-trial psychiatric evaluation -would lead to a prediction of an increase in 
the number of insanity  acquittal^.'^^ Thus, the sharp reduction in the number of insanity 
221 Criss and Racine, supra note 2, at 265. 
222 Id.  
2U Smith and Hall, supra note 2, at 93, 107. 
224 Id.  at 93, 100-01. 
225 See supra note 41. 
226 The "irresistable impulse" test embodies the idea that the defendant "lacks sufficient will 
power to resist the impulse to commit the charged act, by reason of mental unsoundness," and is used 
as a supplement to the M'Naghten rule in a number ofjurisdictions. A. DEUTSCH, THE MENTALLY ILL 
IN AMERICA 397 (2d ed. 1949). 
Prior to 1975, the test for insanity in Michigan was stated thus: 
"[Wlhether or not he [the defendant] exhibited evidences which leave a reasonable 
doubt in your minds of the soundness of his mind in that transaction. Did he know what 
he was doing, - whether it was right or wrong? and if he did, then did he know or did 
he have the power, the will power, to resist the impulse occasioned?" 
People v. Durfee, 62 Mich. 487,494,29 N.W. 109, 112 (1886), cited in People v. Martin, 386 Mich. 
407, 416, 192 N.W.2d 215, 219 (1971). As explained by the court in Martin, "The Michigan test 
encompasse[d] . . . not only a sudden overpowering, irresistable impulse but any situation or condi- 
tion in which the power, 'the will power' to resist, is insufficient to restrain commission of the 
wrongful act." 386 Mich. at 418, 192 N.W.2d at 220. 
227 386 Mich. at 418, 198 N.W.2d at 220. See supra note 48. 
ZUr See supra note 122 and accompanying text. 
229 Michigan GBMI Verdict, supra note 109, at 256. Such pre-trial evaluations were made man- 
adatory by the legislature in the same year that it enacted the GBMI verdict. Id.  
Id.  
Although there is no experimental data available comparing the frequency of NGI verdicts 
under the ALI and M'Naghten plus "irresistable impulse" formulas, there is such data comparing the 
results when the M'Naghten and Durham tests were used. The Durham test is, of course, the rule set 
forth in Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 874-75 (D.C. Cir. 1954), see sufira notes 46-47. In 
THE JURY AND THE DEFENSE OF INSANITY, ~ imon  found that experimental jurors were twelve percent 
more likely to vote for acquittal under theDurham rule than the M'Naghten test. R. S~h~o~,supra note
206, at 216. In addition, data from the District of Columbia show that in the seven years afterDurham 
was decided in 1954, there was "a fifteen-fold increase in the proportion of defendants who were 
acquitted on grounds of insanity!' Id.  at 204. While there is certainly a difference between the 
terminology used in Durham and the ALI tests, it is generally thought that both are more liberal in 
their conception of insanity than the M'Naghten rule. The addition of the "irresistable impulse" 
concept in the old Michigan test would not be likely to have significantly narrowed the difference 
Heinonline - -  26 B.C. L. Rev. 640 1984-1985 
May 19851 GUILTY BUT MENTALLY ILL 64 1 
acquittals in the year that the GBMI law became effective, and, indeed, the low numbers 
of insanity acquittals during the two following years,232 strongly suggests that the GBMI 
option has in fact undermined the ability of defendants to make out a case of insanity. 
What is even more important than this data in the aggregate, however, is the effect in 
a particular trial of the presence of the GBMI verdict as a choice for the court or jury. For 
since, as will be demonstrated, the insanity defense is constitutionally required, then in any 
case in which the defendant's ability to present a successful insanity defense is undercut by 
the meretricious lure of the GBMI verdict, and he is in fact found "guilty but meritally ill" 
rather than not guilty by reason of insanity, he has been denied his constitutional right to 
due process of law. 
Whether or not the verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity is constitutionally 
mandated has been discussed infrequently by courts and legal scholars. The Supreme 
Court has never directly addressed this issue; however, five of the six state courts that 
have considered the constitutional basis of the insanity defense have found it to be 
constitutionally compelled. 
Those Supreme Court decisions that have discussed the insanity defense have fo- 
cused on its procedural aspects. In Davis v. United States,*3 the Supreme Court reversed a 
defendant's murder conviction on the ground that the jury was not instructed that if it 
had a reasonable doubt' as to the defendant's sanity at the time of the offense it must 
acquit him. In so reversing, the Supreme Court appeared to assume, although it did not 
expressly state, that the insanity defense was constitutionally required, because "the crime 
of murder necessarily involves the possession by the accused of such mental capacity 
[sanity] as will render him criminally responsible for his 
In Leland v. Oreg~n,"~ however, the Supreme Court characterized the Davis decision 
as merely "the rule to be followed in federal courts," without constitutional underpin- 
n i n g ~ , ' ~ ~  and held that a state could constitutionally require a defendant to prove his 
insanity beyond a reasonable doubt without running afoul of the due process clause of the 
fourteenth amendment. The Leland Court did not address the question whether the 
insanity defense itself is constitutionally mandated.237 
Most recently, in Ake v. Oklahoma,238 the Court held that the fourteenth amendment's 
guarantee of fundamental fairness in criminal trials required that psychiatric assistance be 
provided an indigent defendant asserting an insanity defense. Specifically, the Court held 
between the M'Naghten and A.L.I. results, since the Michigan test retained the essential cognitive 
emphasis of the M'Naghten rule. 
*= Criss and Racine, supra note 2, at 265; Smith and Hall, supra note 2, at 107, Appendix A, 
Table A. 
160 U.S. 469 (1895). 
Id. at 485. 
235 343 U.S. 790 (1952). 
*s Id. at 797. 
*' Id. at 800, In Rivera v. Delaware, 429 U.S. 877 (1976), the Supreme Court dismissed, for 
want of a substantial federal question, an appeal from a defendant convicted of second degree 
murder who challenged the Delaware law which made insanity an affirmative defense. Justice 
Brennan, dissenting, argued that because sanity is an essential aspect of the requirement of mens rea, 
it must be proved by the state beyond a reasonable doubt. 429 U.S. at 878-79 (Brennan, J., 
dissenting) (citinglnre Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), and Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975)). 
105 S. Ct. 1087 (1985). 
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that such a defendant must be provided, at state expense, with a psychiatrist to examine 
him and testify at trial concerning his mental state at the time of the offense.23g The Court 
held that such expert assistance was constitutionally mandated for two reasons. First, the 
Court held that the state has no interest in convicting a defendant if in fact he was insane 
at the time of the crime.'40 Second, the Court found that without the benefit of expert 
psychiatric testimony concerning the defendant's mental state the risk of an inaccurate 
resolution of sanity issues is extremely high.Z41 Together these two factors led the Court to 
conclude that, "unlike a private litigant, a State may not legitimately assert an interest in 
maintenance of a strategic advantage over the defense, if the result of that advantage is to 
cast a pall on the accuracy of the verdict ~btained."'~" 
Despite the Supreme Court's failure to address directly the question of whether the 
insanity defense is constitutionally compelled, a strong argument can be made that it is so 
compelled, as part of our fundamental "concept of ordered libert~,""~ and that therefore 
any statute or rule of criminal procedure undercutting a defendant's right to present an 
insanity defense is unconstitutional. To appreciate this contention, it is necessary to put 
the insanity defense in its proper historical and jurisprudential context. 
At the heart of the criminal law is the principle that moral blameworthiness is an 
essential predicate to legal responsibility. The requirement of moral blameworthiness 
finds expression in the concept of mens rea,'44 a prohibited mental state, and in the notion 
of auoluntary the actus r e ~ s , ' ~ ~  which is also an essential element of every crime. An 
examination of the structure of the criminal law as a whole reveals that the insanity 
defense describes but one of the many situations in the criminal law in which a person 
who does an act prohibited by a penal statute is not held responsible for the commission of 
that act, because his conduct is either excused or justified. Just as a person acting under 
mistake of fact is not held liable if that mistaken belief precluded him from forming the 
requisite mental state required for a particular crime,247 just as a person acting under 
duress is not held criminally re~ponsible,'~~ and just as a person who shoots anot.her in 
self-defense is not liable,249 so too the insanity acquittee is exempted from a criminal 
penalty for his admittedly unlawful act because he lacked the moral blameworthiness 
necessary to convict. 
Even the defense of provocation, which will, in most jurisdictions, reduce a homicide 
from murder to manslaughter despite the accused's intent to kill or cause great bodily 
Id. at 1092. 
240 Id. at 109495. 
241 Id. at 1096. 
2u Id. at 1095. 
2U Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). 
244 See supra note 27. 
245 See, e.g., People v. Newton, 8 Cal. App. 3d 359,376, 87 Cal Rptr. 394, 403 (1970); MODEL 
PENAL CODE § 2.01(1) (1982). 
246 The actus reus is a voluntary act or omission (under circumstances in which one has a legal 
duty to act) which is an essential element of every crime. A person is not blameworthy if he does not 
commit a prohibited act or omission. Under our criminal law one may not be punished for evil 
thoughts alone. MODEL PENAL CODE 2.01 (1982); S. KADISH, S. SCHULHOFER, & M. PAULSON, supra 
note 27, at 257-59. 
"' See, e.g., People v. Mayberry, 15 Cal. 3d 143, 154, 542 P.2d 1337, 125 Cal. Rptr. 745, 752 
(1975); MODEL PENAL CODE 8 2.04 (1982). 
248 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE 8 2.09 (1982). 
See, e.g., State v. Wanrow, 88 Wash. 2d 221,235-36,559 P.2d 548,556 (1977); MODEL PENAL 
CODE $ 3.04 (1982). 
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harm to the victim,250 is based upon the fundamental principle of free will and moral 
blameworthiness. The provocation of the victim reduces the seriousness of the defen- 
dant's crime because it is believed that due to these provoking circumstances, circum- 
stances to some degree outside his control, he is less blameworthy than one who kills 
without such provocation.251 So too in the case of the insanity acquittee, circumstances 
beyond his control, although they occur within his own. mind, make it inappropriate to 
impose blame for his conduct. 
All of the tests for insanity, from M'Naghten to the Model Penal C0de,2~~ are predi- 
cated on this fundamental principle of blameworthiness, that a person ought not to be 
held responsible if his conduct was not the result of his exercise of free will or a conscious 
choice to do wrong. Each test is an attempt to give a definition of that involuntariness, of a 
lack of ability to choose, which, it is thought, appropriately excludes from responsibility 
those who could not elect to do right or wrong, those who did not exercise their free will 
in embarking upon a criminal course of conduct. 
Thus, to say that the insanity defense is an anomaly in the grand scheme of our 
criminal law is simply wrong. To  the contrary, our criminal justice system requires moral 
blameworthiness for a e r y  act subject to criminal sanction, save those which have been 
made strict liability offenses. "The contention that an injury can amount to a crime only 
when inflicted by intention is . . . as universal and persistent in mature systems of law as 
belief in freedom of the human will and a consequent ability and duty of the normal 
individual to choose between good and This principle, that moral blameworthi- 
ness is an essential predicate to a criminal conviction, was established early in English 
common law,z54 and was carried over into the laws of the colonies and the new republic, 
even without express statutory enunciation.255 
It is not surprising, then, that all but one of the six state courts which have considered 
the constitutional basis of the insanity defense have found it to be constitutionally re- 
See, e.g., Maher v. People, 10 Mich. 212 (1862); Director of Public Prosecutions v. Camplin, 
House of Lords, [I9781 2 All E.R. 168; MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3 (1982). 
The defense of manslaughter is designed for those "cases of intentional homicide where the 
situation is as much to blame as the actor." MODEL PENAL CODE 210.3 comment (1982). Put another 
way, "the greater the provocation . . . the more ground there is for attributing the intensity of the 
actor's passions and his lack of self-control . . . to the extraordinary character of the situation in which 
he was placed rather than to any extraordinary deficiency in his own character." Michael and 
Wechsler, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide, 37 COLUM. L. REV. 1261, 1281-82 (1937). Both these 
sources are cited in S. KADISH, S. SCHULHOFER, & M. PAULSEN, supra note 27, at 439-41. 
See supra text accompanying notes 41-43. 
253 Morrisette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952); accord, Durham v. United States, 214 
F.2d 862, 876 (D.C. Cir. 1954). 
"' See supra text accompanying notes 23-33. 
25s As the Supreme Court noted in -M-ette v. United States: 
Crime, as a compound concept, generally constituted only from concurrence of an 
evil-meaning mind with an evil-doing hand, was congenial to an intense individualism 
and took deep and early root in American soil. As the states codified the common law of 
crimes, even if their enactments were silent on the subject, their courts assumed that the 
omission did not signify disapproval of the principle but merely recognized that intent 
was so inherent in the idea of the offense that it required no statutory affirmation. 
Courts, with little hesitation or division, found an implicaton of the requirement as to 
offenses that were taken over from the common law. 
342 U.S. at 251-52 (footnotes omitted). Some states have explicitly adopted the common law of 
England as controlling precedent so long as it does not conflict with existing federal or state statutes 
or constitutional provisions. See, e.g, UTAH CODE -68-3-1 (1978). 
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quired, recognizing it as an aspect of the fundamental fairness guaranteed by the due 
process clause of the fourteenth amendment or comparable state constitutional provi- 
sions. In State v. Stra~berg ,~~~ for example, the Washington Supreme Court declaredthat a 
state law which eliminated insanity as a defense was violative of the defendant's right to 
due process of law and his right to jury trial, both of which were guaranteed by the 
Washington constitution. The court rejected the prosecution's therapeutic justification 
for the elimination of the insanity defense, namely that "because of modern humane 
methods in caring for . . . those convicted of crime, there is no longer any reason for 
taking into consideration the element of will on the part of those who commit prohibited 
acts, when their guilt is being determined for the purpose of . . . restraint and treat- 
ment."257 Instead, the court held that the insanity defense was an essential part of the 
common law of England and America, a necessary concomitant of the criminal law's mens 
rea requirement and of the defendant's right to trial by jury, and thus could not constitu- 
tionally be abrogated by the legislat~re."~ 
Likewise, in Sinclair u. St~te,"~ the Mississippi Supreme Court struck down a state 
statute which eliminated insanity as a defense to murder, but provided that evidence of 
insanity could be offered to support a verdict of "guilty . . . but insane," which would 
reduce the sentence for murder from death to life imprisonment. The court held that the 
law violated the Mississippi Constitution's due process clause, which provides: " 'No 
. - 
person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property except by due process of law.' ""O In 
addition, one concurring justice found the new law to violate the due process and equal 
protection clauses of the state and federal constitutions,"' and the constitutional prohibi- 
tion against cruel and unusual punishment, on the ground that it was cruel to subject an 
insane person to life i m p r i s ~ n m e n t . ~ ~  
The Louisiana Supreme Court has held that the insanity defense is constitutionally 
required in two cases. In the early case of State u. Lange,"j3 the court struck down a state 
statute which withdrew the question of the determination of insanity from the courts to a 
lunacy commission composed of the superintendents of Louisiana's state mental hospitals. 
The court held this statute to violate provisions of the state constitution which gave 
exclusive jurisdiction of criminal cases to the courts and which guaranteed the right to 
trial by jury. In a second case almost fifty years later the court found that juveniles had a 
constitutional right to present an insanity defense."j4 According to the court, "the denial 
s6 60 Wash. i06, 110 P. 1020 (1910). 
257 Id. at 123, 110 P. at 1025. 
Id. at 112-15, 110 P. at 1021-23. See also Morrisette, 342 U.S. at 250, and Murray's Lessee V. 
Hoboken Land and Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272, 276-77 (1855). In Murray's Lessee the Supreme 
Court held that in determining whether a legislative enactment violates due process of law, courts 
"must look to those settled usages and modes of proceeding existing in the common and statute law 
of England, before the emigration of our ancestors, and which are shown not to have been unsuited 
to their civil and political condition by having been acted on by them after the settlement of this 
country." 59 U.S. at 277. 
259 161 Miss. 142, 132 So. 581 (1931). 
2w Id. at 153, 132 So. at 582 (quoting MISS. CONST. OF 1890, 8 14). 
261 Id. at 164-71, 132 So. at 586-88 (Ethridge, J., concurring). He found that the equal protection 
clause had been violated since a defendant who lacked malice aforethought, the mental state 
required for murder, could be found guilty only of manslaughter, which carried a maximum term of 
twenty years, while an insane defendant, who lacked all necessary mens rea, could be sentenced to 
life imprisonment. Id.  at 167, 132 So. at 587 (Ethridge, J., concurring). 
Id.  at 161, 132 So. at 584 (Ethridge, J., concurring). 
263 168 La. 958, 966, 123 So. 639, 642 (1929). 
264 In re Causey, 363 So. 2d 472 (La. 1978). 
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of the right to plead insanity, with no alternative means of exculpation or special treat- 
ment for an insane person unable to understand the nature of his act, violates the concept 
of fundamental fairness implicit in the due process guaranties."265 
The Minnesota Supreme Court has also held that the right of a defendant to assert an 
insanity defense is guaranteed by the due process clauses of both the state and federal 
 constitution^.^^^ In State v. Hoffman, the court found that a criminal defendant has a 
fundamental right to present an insanity defense, and that this right was not impaired by 
jury instructions which permitted the jury to consider evidence of the defendant's mental 
state solely to determine if the M'Naghten test of insanity was satisfied.267 
Only in the case of State v.. K0re11~~~ did a state supreme court uphold a legislative 
abolition of the insanity defense. In Korell, the Montana Supreme Court rejected the 
defendant's challenge to the Montana legislature's elimination of the "traditional" defense 
of insanity. In  so ruling, the court placed heavy emphasis on the provisions in the relevant 
statute requiring the consideration of the defendant's mental state at the time of the 
offense, both at the trial, under the rubric of mens rea,269 and at sentencing, where the 
- 
court was required to evaluate the defendant's mental state at the time of the crime in 
accordance with the Model Penal Code test of insanity and commit him to "an appropriate 
institution for custody, care, and treatment" if he was insane at that time.270 
Except forKorell then, in' every case in which a state court has considered whether the 
insanity defense is constitutionally compelled, the court has held that the insanity defense 
is constitutionally required as a necessary concomitant of either the right to due process of 
law or the right to jury trial. Such a conclusion seems inescapable. The insanity defense 
has historically been an integral aspect of the criminal law's requirement of moral 
blameworthiness as a precondition to the imposition of a penal sanction.27' The right to 
assert an insanity defense in a criminal trial must be recognized as a liberty interest " 'so 
rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental,' "272 
- - 
and therefore, entitled to the protection of the due process clause."3 
265 Id. at 474. 
266 State v. Hoffman, 328 N.W.2d 709 (Minn. 1982). 
267 328 N.W.2d at 715. 
-, Mont. -, 690 P.2d 992 (1984). 
269 Id. at -, 690 P.2d at 1000. 
270 Id. at -, 690 P.2d at 997. 
271 See supra text accompanying notes 23-33. 
272 Griswold V. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 487 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (quoting 
Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)). 
273 Justice Goldberg stated in Grimold that "the concept of liberty protects those personal rights 
that are fundamental, and is not confined to the specific terms of the Bill of Rights." 381 U.S. at 486 
(Goldberg, J., concurring). In agreeing with the Court's striking down of a Connecticut statute which 
prohibited physicians from prescribing contraceptive devices to married women, Justice Goldberg 
relied heavily on the ninth amendment's express provision that, "The enumeration in the Constitu- 
tion, of certain rights, shall not be construedto deny or disparage others retained by the people."Id. 
at 488 (Goldberg, J., concurring). He noted that the amendment had been added to the Bill of Rights 
to quiet "fears that a bill of specifically enumerated rights could not be sufficiently broad to cover all 
essential rights and that the specific mention of certain rights would be interpreted as a denial that 
others were protected."Id. at 488-89 (Goldberg, J., concurring). Just as with the case of the right of 
marital privacy deemed fundamental in Gnkwold, so too is the right of a criminal defendant to 
present a defense which goes to the question of his moral blameworthiness, his ability to choose to do 
good or evil, a fundamental liberty right which must be found to be constitutionally based, despite its 
lack of specific enumeration in the Constitution. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148-55 
(1968) (historical analysis of the role of trial by jury in the Anglo-American criminal law demon- 
strated its fundamental importance in safeguarding the essential liberty interest of criminal defen- 
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The GBMI verdict undercuts a defendant's right to present an insanity defense just 
as surely as did any of the state statutes struck down in Lunge, Sinclair, or Strmberg. 
Established in an attempt to reach people who would otherwise "fall through the cracks of 
the criminal justice system" by virtue of an insanity acq~ittal,';~ the GBMI statutes provide 
vague and deliberately confusing definitions of the distinction between being "insane" 
and "mentally ill," and at the same time make it extremely attractive to the trier of fact to 
return a GBMI verdict instead of a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity, by holding 
out the twin promises of incarceration and treatment. "A judge [or juror] can satisfy the 
demands of the press and the public to get the criminals off the street and at the same 
time salve his conscience with the belief that he is helping the offender by. . . sending him 
to prison for the purpose of treatment or cure.""5 But, as shown earlier, the promise of 
treatment for GBMI prisoners has been unfulfilled, leaving incarceration and the protec- 
tion of public safety as the only purpose actually served by the GBMI verdict. While 
protection of the public is a reasonable goal -and indeed was one of the major functions 
of the insanity defense until ten or fifteen years ago -it is constitutionally impermissible 
to achieve it by depriving criminal defendants of both a meaningful right to present an 
insanity defense and the right to treatment. "To deprive any citizen of his or her liberty 
upon the altruistic theory that the confinement is for humane and therapeutic reasons, 
and then fail to provide adequate treatment, violates the very fundamentals of due 
pro~ess."'~~ Thus, the GBMI verdict is unconstitutional, violating a criminal defendant's 
constitutional right to due process and equal protection of the laws, and denying a 
convicted offender his right to adequate psychiatric treatment. 
IV. CONDITIONAL RELEASE AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE GUILTY 
BUT MENTALLY ILL STATUTES 
Much of the recent animosity toward the insanity defense has been expressed in the 
idea that insanity acquittees are in some way "getting off," escaping liability for the 
punishment they so richly deserve through the legal loophole of the insanity defense. The 
impetus for the enactment of the GBMI statutes was a growing public concern that 
persons found not guilty by reason of insanity were being released prematurely, without 
an adequate assessment either of their mental competence or, more significantly, of their 
potential for dangerous criminal actions in the future. The GBMI statutes were passed in 
an effort to reduce the number of persons found not guilty by reason of insanity and 
thereby, presumably, to protect the public. But, as pointed out above, the GBMI statutes 
represent a misguided and constitutionally defective attempt to deal with the relationship 
between crime and mental illness. 
In assessing alternatives to the GBMI statutes, two separate issues must be addressed. 
The first deals with the function of the insanity defense within the framework of our 
criminal law. Since, as has been demonstrated, the insanity defense is not an anomaly 
within the Anglo-American criminal law, but is entirely consistent with the fundamental 
principles of that jurisprudence, it needs to be maintained to insure the coherence of the 
dants); see also In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,363-64 (1970) (proof beyond a reasonable doubt held to 
be contitutionally required as an essential part of due process of law, even though it was not 
enumerated in the Constitution or the Bill of Rights). 
274 See supra text accompanying notes 106-07. 
. 275 Forer, supra note 172, at 66. 
276 Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, 785 (M.D. Ala. 1972). 
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criminal law as a whole. At the same time, however, the disposition of insanity acquittees 
must be considered. A preferred alternative to the GBMI statutes would retain the 
insanity defense as a means of excusing from criminal responsibility that rare individual 
who ought not to be blamed for his conduct, while at the same time safeguarding the 
public from persons who may pose a risk of future dangerousness. 
Such an alternative may be the approach, taken by a number of states, of the 
conditional release of insanity acquittees. In contrast with the GBMI statutes, in which the 
emphasis is on a change in the verdict which may be rendered at an insanity defense trial, 
the emphasis in conditional release is on the post-verdict stage: on what happens after a 
judgment of not guilty by reason of insanity is rendered. The GBMI statutes seek to 
protect the public by limiting the number of persons who may be found not guilty by 
reason of insanity. The conditional release approach, on the other hand, seeks to assure 
the public's protection by providing meaningful psychiatric treatment and effective 
supervision of insanity acquittees, through a program of graduated, step-by-step relaxa- 
tion of controls which is designed with both the acquittee's mental health and his apparent 
dangerousness in mind. 
The theory behind conditional release is relatively straightforward. Psychiatrists have 
long recognized the difficulty in predicting the future dangerousness of an incarcerated 
individual,277 simply because the environment in which the psychiatrist sees this person is 
so different than that of the outside world. What may be a successful adjustment to the 
constraints of institutional life may be maladaptive behavior for the real world. As one 
court has put it, "[G]ood patients may be bad r i ~ k s . " ~ ~ ~  
An insanity acquittee may become adjusted to life inside the hospital. . . . But 
[this] adjustment . . . gives no assurance that [he] . . . would refrain from 
reestablishing [his] . . . undesirable behavior patterns if released. In fact, the 
more completely a person accepts the regulated environment of the hospital, 
the more unfitted he may be to deal with the demands of an unregulated free . 
life.279 
277 Indeed, today there is nearly universal agreement among both psychiatrists and lawyers that 
psychiatric predictions of dangerousness are quite inaccurate and unreliable. For example, the 
American Psychiatric Association's Task Force on Clinical Aspects of the Violent Offender has 
declared: "U]udgments [of dangerousness] are fundamentally of very low reliability, much as would 
be the prediction of 'altruism' or other human behaviors." TASK FORCE REPORT #8, Clinical Aspects 
of the Violent Offender 23 (1974) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE REPORT]. 
Similarly: 
[There] is a large and growing body of research dramatically demonstrating that when 
a group of prisoners or mental patients who have been predicted to be violent are 
nonetheless released into the community, the majority, frequently the vast majority, do 
not commit the violent behavior expected of them . . . The persistence of thirfinding is itrelf 
remarkable: no study h ever found prediction to be more accurate than inaccurate. 
Monahan, Prediction Research and the Emergency Commitment of Dangerous Mentnlly Ill Persons: A Recon- 
sideration, 135 AM. J .  PSYCHIATRY 198, 199 (1978) (emphasis added). 
Despite the skepticism with which a growing number of psychiatrists, social scientists, and 
lawyers view predictions of future dangerousness, some jurists still find such predictions persuasive. 
See, e.g., Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983) (Supreme Court upheld Texas' use of psychiatric 
prediction of future dangerousness as a factor to be considered in determining whether the death 
penalty ought to be imposed), reh'g denied, 464 U.S. 874 (1983). 
278 State v. Carter, 64 N.J. 382, 403, 316 A.2d 449, 461 (1974). 
278 Weihofen, supra note 173, at 864. Accord, K. BURKHART, WOMEN IN PRISN 132 (1973). 
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Conversely, a patient who is aggressive, independent, and questioning of authority may 
well be better equipped to handle life in normal society.2s0 
Recognizing this predictive problem, courts in a number of states have attempted to 
reconcile the public's concern about the premature release of insanity acquittees, who are 
perceived as being more dangerous than other offenders because of their mental ill- 
ness,"I with the acquittees' liberty interest in being free from state custody if they are no 
longer mentally ill o r  dange ro~s . "~  In a conditional release program, the court and the 
treating psychiatrist have an opportunity to observe the acquittee's behavior as he moves 
from greater to lesser restrictions on his liberty, and can thereby assess more accurately 
the likelihood that the acquittee will engage in violent actions if he is released without 
restraint into the community. A good conditional release program provides a 
built-in graded system wherein a person could be sent from a maximum 
security to a moderate security to a civil hospital to a halfway house, have the 
options of out-patient treatment under mandate, so that the psychiatrists . . . 
who are treating the person and . . . testifying to the judge who maintains 
jurisdiction over the case . . . would have the option of evaluating the person 
in various degrees of security . . . .283 
T h e  therapy-centered approach of conditional release makes good financial sense as 
well. I n  New Jersey, for example, a good conditional release program will provide the 
*' Id. Cf. FFlynn,PsychotropicDrugs andInfmed Consent, 30 HOSP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 51, 
53 (1979). 
The public is more afraid of insanity acquittees than other persons charged with crime 
because the former are viewed as both "mad" and "bad," and therefore unpredictable in their 
violence. But the limited data which is available shows that many insanity acquittees are acquitted of 
non-violent crimes and that the overwhelming majority of mentally ill criminals who have been 
predicted to be dangerous turn out not to be so. 
In New Jersey, for example, "a survey of insanity acquittals during the years 1974-1982 . . . 
showed that deaths were involved in less than one-third of all cases. Interestingly, the plea was also 
raised in cases of non-violent offenses such as writing false checks, carrying an unloaded starter's 
pistol, and drug use." Rodriguez letter, supra note 2. See also Pasewark, Insanity Plea: A Review ofthe 
Research Literature, 9 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 357,366 (1981). In Oregon, "only about 5 percent of the. . . 
insanity acquittees were acquitted of murder, with assault and less seriouscrime being the bulk of the 
cases." Insanity Hearings, supra note 80, at 470 (testimony of Dr. John Monahan). 
As to the consequences of releasing the criminally insane, perhaps the most startling results were 
obtained in Operation Baxstrom, the release of New York prisoners mandated by the Supreme 
Court's decision in Baxrtrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966). The decision in Baxrtrom led to the 
transfer of 967 inmates of hospitals for the criminally insane to regular civil hospitals. Ultimately, 
some of these were returned to the community in accordance with existing civil commitment and 
release procedures. "These patients were considered to be among the most dangerous in the state 
and were expected to display their dangerousness both in the civil hospitals to which they were 
transferred and in the community upon their release. The level of dangerous behavior among the 
patients we followed in the community was 14 percent . . . . [OJur four-year follow-up of these 
patients revealed that only 26 of the 967 had exhibited sufficiently violent behavior at the civil 
hospitals to justify their return to hospitals for the criminally insane." Cocozza and Steadman, The 
Failure of Psychiatric Predictions of Dangeroumess: Clear and Convicting Evidence, 29 RUTCERS L. REV. 
1084, 1090-93 (1976). 
282 In O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975), the Supreme Court declared that there is no 
constitutional basis for confining even a mentally ill individual involuntarily if he is "dangerous to no 
one and can li.ve safely in freedom."Id. at 575. Similarly, there can be no state interest in confining a 
non-mentally ill individual based upon a psychiatric prediction of dangerousness. Such involuntary 
commitment is the equivalent of preventitive detention. 
Insanity Hearings, supra note 80, at 462-63 (testimony of Dr. Robert Sadoff). 
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insanity acquittee with room and board at a half-way house located in the community, 
daily participation in an out-patient treatment program, and a weekly visit with a psychia- 
trist. Such a program costs approximately $20,000 per year, roughly 55% of what it would 
cost to maintain the acquittee in a state mental hospital, and only $3,000 more than the 
average cost of maintaining an inmate in a New Jersey prison, with only minimal psychiat- 
ric treatment.284 Similarly, in Oregon, the current maximum cost of maintaining an 
insanity acquittee in a conditional release program is $13,282 per year, approximately 
one-third the amount required to maintain him in the forensic unit of the state mental 
hospital.285 This too compares favorably with the cost of providing psychiatric care in an 
Oregon prison, where the current average cost of maintaining an inmate in prison is 
$13,412 per year, and the additional cost of providing psychiatric treatment or other 
therapeutic counseling is $105 per day, or $39,022 per year.286 Thus it cannot be convinc- 
ingly argued, as it might in the case of an economically depressed state like Michigan, that 
the conditional release of insanity acquittees is fiscally impractical. 
Two principal approaches to conditional release presently exist: the administrative 
and the judicial models. The sole representative of the administrative model is Oregon's 
Psychiatric Security Review Board (hereinafter PSRB or Board). This Board was estab- 
lished by statute in 1977 in response to concerns of the public and state mental health 
personnel that insanity acquittees were being prematurely released from state mental 
hospitals without adequate judicial, or other, supervision.287 The Board is an independent 
state agency with five members - a psychiatrist, a psychologist, a person with substantial 
parole and probation expertise and experience, a public member, and an experienced 
criminal trial lawyer not presently a prosecutor or public defender.288 The Board meets 
periodically to review the disposition of all insanity acquittees committed to its jurisdic- 
tion. 
Under Oregon law, after a trial, the judge must determine what crime the acquittee 
"would have been convicted of had [he] . . . been found responsible."289 If this crime is a 
felony or a violent misdemeanor, and "the court finds, by a preponderance of the 
Personal Communication from Patrick D. Reilly, Mental Health Consultant, Department of 
the Public Advocate, Division of Mental Health Advocacy, State of New Jersey, Trenton, New Jersey 
(April, 1985). 
285 Personal Communication from Thomas 0. Stern, Data Coordinator for the Program Office 
of Mental or Emotional Disturbance, Oregon Mental Health Division, Salem, Oregon (April, 1985). 
286 Personal Communication from Marlene Haugland, Executive Assistant to the Director of the 
Oregon Department of Corrections, Salem, Oregon (April, 1985). 
287 There were 268 persons acquitted on grounds of insanity in Oregon during the period 1971 
to 1976, compared with 225 insanity acquittals in New York State (which had a population nearly 
eight times as large as Oregon's) during the same period. Pati, Letter to the Editor, 136 AM. J. 
PSYCHIATRY 1346, 1346-47 (1979). Because of this large number of insanity acquittees, judges were 
unable to keep track of all the people whom they had committed to the state hospital, to design 
effective conditional release programs for them, or to monitor their performance while conditionally 
released. Some judges were felt to be overly deferential to the views of mental health personnel. As a 
result of inadequate judicial supervision and hospital overcrowding, "many individuals were released 
from the hospital after a very short stay." Rogers, 1981 Oregon Legislation Relating to the Insanity 
D$me and the Psychiatric Security Review Board, 18 WILLAM- L.J. 23, 24 (1982). As in Michigan, 
"several incidents of serious anti-social behavior among the [prematurely] released population . . . 
pointed to the need for more stringent supervision." Bloom and Bloom, Duposition of Zmanity Defase 
Cases in Oregon, 9 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 93, 95 (1981). 
288 OR. REV. STAT. 5 161.385 (I), (2) (1983): 
OR. REV. STAT. 5 161.325 (2)(a) (1983). 
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evidence that the person is affected by mental disease or defect and presents a substantial 
danger to others requiring commitment to a state mental hospital . . . or conditional 
release, the court shall order the person placed under the jurisdiction of the Psychiatric 
Security Review Board for care and treatment. . . "290 for the maximum sentence he could 
have received had he been found responsible. 
Within ninety days of an insanity acquittee's commitment to the state mental hospital 
and two years of an acquittee's conditional release, the PSRB must review the case and 
determine whether the disposition is appropriate or whether the acquittee should be 
conditionally or unconditionally released.291 The Board's decision is to be based primarily 
on the criterion of "the protection of society," not on the insanity acquittee's treatment 
needs.292 Conditional release is mandated, however, if the PSRB "finds that the person 
presents a substantial danger to others but that the person can be adequately controlled 
with supervision and treatment if conditionally released and that necessary supervision 
and treatment are available . . . ."293 This approach thus apparently codifies the doctrine 
of the "least restrictive alternative which has long been advocated as a necessary aspect of 
all civil commitment of the mentally 
The alternative to the administrative model of conditional release is the judicial one, 
presently authorized by statute in more than half the states.295 One example of a good 
judicial conditional release program is the New Jersey program. As long ago as the early 
1970's, the New Jersey Supreme Court recognized the need for a phased, gradual return 
of the insanity acquittee to the community, which was carefully monitered by individual 
trial judges to insure that the interests of both the insanity acquittee and the public were 
protected. Under the New Jersey scheme, as articulated by its Supreme Court in State v. 
Carter,296 a program of conditional release of insanity acquittees is required to balance the 
public's interest in protection from dangerous offenders and the insanity acquittee's right 
to psychiatric treatment. In Carter, the court held that persons acquitted on grounds of 
insanity had a right to conditional release from the mental institution to which they had 
Z90 OR. REV. STAT. 0 161.327 (1983). 
291 OR. REV. STAT. 0 161.341 (7) (1983). 
292 OR. REV. STAT. 0 161.336 (10) (1983). 
OR. REV. STAT. 0 161.336 (1) (1983). 
One Oregon court has found that this provision imposes a heavy burden on the PSRB to find a 
suitable conditional release placement for an insanity acquittee, and that mere difficulty in finding 
one is not sufficient to meet this burden. Cochenour v. Pgchiatric Sec. Revim Bd., 47 Or. App. 1097, 
1106-07, 615 P.2d 1155, 1160 (1980). 
2s4 Under this doctrine, a state must show that "a particular legislative course [is] . . . the least 
drastic method of achieving a desired end . . . . m h e  state must demonstrate that the infringement 
upon human liberties which occurs isunuuoidubk if the purpose of the state is to be achieved." Singer, 
Sending Men to P&a:  Constitutional Aspects o f  the Burden o f  Proof and the Doctrine of the Least Drastic 
Alternaliue as Applied to Sentencing Detpinat iom, 58 CORNELL . REV. 51, 55-56 (1972) (emphasis in 
original). 
The doctrine has been applied in a number of cases concerning the mentally ill which have 
declared that the state must provide for its mentally ill a therapeutic environment which is the least 
restrictive one necessary to achieve the safety of the mentally ill individual and the public. See, e.g., 
Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657, 660-62 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (court ordered the District of Columbia 
authorities to show that no alternative means existed, other than confinement in a large public 
mental hospital, of protecting a senile sixty year old woman who "wandered" in the streets of 
Washington, D.C.) 
295 See State v. Carter, 64 N.J. 382, 401 n.lO, 316 A.2d 449, 460 n.10 (1974). 
64 N.J. 382, 316 A.2d 449 (1974). 
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been committed even if they were not fully "restored to reason" or "cured" of their 
underlying mental illness, as long as there was adequate psychiatric supervision and other 
provisions for the protection of the public. The court premised its decision on the 
fundamental purpose of committing insanity acquittees to a mental hospital - treatment 
and rehabilitation, which could only be achieved by a judicially authorized gradual, 
supervised return to the community.297 To  deny "the possibility of conditional release," 
said the court, would be " 'tantamount to an elaborate mask for preventive detention' of 
the mentally ill."298 
In State v. K r 0 1 , ~ ~ ~  the New Jersey Supreme Court built upon Carter, to hold that for 
purposes of evaluating insanity acquittees' continued need for psychiatric hospitalization 
and treatment, they were to be treated just like other "civilly" mentally ill individuals, with 
the same procedural safeguards and substantive commitment criteria used for this latter ' 
The court reached this result based upon considerations of both due process301 
and equal protection of the laws.302 
This court-centered approach to determining when, and under what conditions, the 
release of an insanity acquittee is appropriate, has been endorsed by the American Bar 
Association's Standing Committee on Association Standards for Criminal Justice. These 
standards suggest that all decisions regarding "authorized leave," defined to encompass 
anything "from a brief pass through a projected long-term release on conditions,"303 
should be subject to judicial scrutiny before being implemented, to ensure adequate 
consideration of the problems of "public safety and community concern" along with the 
therapeutic desirability or necessity of the authorized leave.304 
Whether administratively or judicially supervised, then, conditional release of insan- 
ity acquittees provides an alternative to the GBMI statutes which protects both the 
e 
offender's constitutional rights and the public safety at a reasonable cost. Such an ap- 
proach also leaves intact the insanity defense, which is crucial to maintaining the require- 
ment of blameworthiness throughout the criminal law as a precondition to conviction. 
The insanity defense had its genesis in a simple, homogeneous, highly religious and 
moralistic society. At the time of its inception it was easy to have a rule exempting from 
b 
2Q7 The judicial approach also has the advantage of frankly acknowledging that the decision to 
release is a political and policy one. Medical opinion is an important factor to be weighed in making 
this decision, but it is only part of the equation. In our society, the job of balancing conflicting 
individual and social interests has been given to judges, not doctors. See Insanity Hearings, supra note 
80, at 472-73 (testimony of Dr. John Monahan). 
Carter, 64 N.J. at 398,316 A.2d at 458 (quoting Greenwald, Disposition ofthe Insane Dejendant 
After 'Acquittal' -The LongRoad From Commitment To Release, 49 J. CRIM. L. C. & P.S. 583,586 (1959). 
2* 68 N.J. 236, 344 A.2d 289 (1975). 
In State v. Fields, 77 N.J. 282,390 A.2d 574 (1978), the New Jersey Supreme Court declared 
that the Krol mandate of equality of treatment of the "criminally" and "civilly" mentally ill meant that 
both groups were required to have automatic periodic judicial review of their commitments, includ- 
ing the terms of their conditional release, to determine if the restrictions on their liberty which had 
been previously ordered by the court were still necessary. 77 N.J. at 297-99,390 A.2d at 581-82. 
301 Krol, 68 N.J. at 246-49, 344 A.2d at 295-96. 
=02 Id. at 250-55, 344 A.2d at 297-99. 
303 ABA Standing Committee on Association Standards for Criminal Justice, Provisional Crimi- 
nal Justice Mental Health Standards V-8 (April, 1982). 
3M Id.; see also Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972). 
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criminal responsibility those few individuals who lacked a "vicious will,"305 particularly 
when the result of a finding of insanity was lengthy, if not lifetime, incarceration in an 
insane asylum rather than death. 
In a complex and heterogeneous society, however, the insanity defense is called upon 
to answer a number of competing questions: the moral question of who may justly be held 
responsible, the psychiatric question of how best to treat the mentally ill offender, and the 
soaal policy question of how best to protect the community from dangerous individuals 
while at the same time safeguarding those individuals' constitutional rights. Today, the 
exculpation from criminal liability provided by the insanity defense is deeply troubling to 
many citizens. They find it inconceivable that a person could on one day suffer from 
mental illness so severe as to not know what he was doing or to be able to stop himself 
- from doing it, and then, a few months later, due to psychiatric treatment and medication, 
be pronounced "sane." Their sense of justice is offended, particularly if the defendant 
was charged with a serious offense. The result, in a time of great concern about crime in 
general, is tremendous public pressure to minimize or eliminate the use of the insanity 
defense, pressure to which Congress has recently acceded in enacting a drastically re- 
duced version of the insanity defense for federal criminal offenses. 
This article has examined another attempt to reduce the "abuse" of the insanity 
defense, the "Guilty But Mentally 111" statutes, and has concluded that these laws are a 
constitutionally impermissible means of dealing with the dangerous mentally ill offender. 
The GBMI statutes improperly cloak a punitive attitude toward the mentally ill criminal 
in the guise of treatment, confusing the very different theoretical underpinnings of a 
system of punishment and a system of treatment. These laws deny mentally ill persons 
who are found "guilty but mentally ill" instead of not guilty by reason of insanity their 
"constitutional right to receive such individual [psychiatric] treatment as will give each of 
them a realistic opportunity to be cured or to improve . . . his mental condition."300 In 
practice, the psychiatric treatment accorded GBMI inmates tends to be either minimal or 
nonexistent. Even GBMI prisoners who receive adequate treatment at a psychiatric 
hospital are denied the equal protection of the laws when compared to insanity acquittees, 
since GBMI convicts must serve out the remainder of their prison terms upon restoration 
to mental health, while insanity acquittees must be released. 
The constitutional violation of the denial of the right to treatment is compounded by 
the inherent tendency of the GBMI statutes to encourage compromise verdicts. Due to 
the statutes' inadequate distinction between "mental illness" and "insanity," it is possible, 
and indeed likely, for a trier of fact to resolve any doubts it may have about a defendant's 
sanity at the time of the offense in favor of a finding of "mere" mental illness. That 
finding assures the trier of fact that the defendant will be kept off the streets for some 
time, while it simultaneously holds out the promise of psychiatric treatment for an 
obviously disturbed individual. The constitutional right to present an insanity defense, 
inherent in the constitutional rights to due process and equal protection of the laws, is 
denied in any case in which a defendant is found "guilty but mentally ill" when, without 
that option, he would have been found not guilty by reason of insanity. 
In contrast, the conditional release approach, while not perfect, holds out the pro- 
mise of making the insanity defense viable today. The conditional release approach 
continues to accept the fundamental premise of the insanity defense that there are a few 
305 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 33, at 19. 
306 Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, 784 (M.D. Ala. 1972). 
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individuals who cannot morally be held accountable for their actions. In practice it offers 
a real chance of meaningful psychiatric therapy and a return to sanity for such mentally ill 
offenders. At the same time, it strives to protect society from the dangerous mentally ill 
individual in a manner maximizing the vindication of the latter's constitutional rights. 
Conditional release thus provides the best answer we have today to the difficult moral, 
medical, and political questions raised by the insanity defense. Its adoption and im- 
plementation across the nation would, in the long run, provide greater public protection 
than the superfically attractive GBMI approach. 
We live in an age in which people are expressing greater fears about their safety and 
security, and are concerned about a lack of control over their lives. At such a time, it is 
easy to seize upon the perceived abuses of the insanity defense as both symbol and cause 
of increased crime and disorder. Yet the insanity defense is no more than "a pimple on 
the nose of justice,"307 and the "Guilty But Mentally Ill'' statutes are no more than an 
ill-conceived and ill-fitting band-aid. 
Stone, The Insanity Defense on Trial, 33 HARV. L. SCH. BULL. 15, 17 (1982). 
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